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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past four decades pro-business interests have spent tens of
millions of dollars in an effort to reshape the civil justice system.'
Under the banner of "tort reform," the insurance, manufacturing,
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. Thanks to Mary Davis, Mike Green, Wayne
Logan, Colleen Murphy, and John Noyes for comments on an earlier draft and to Alexandra Baez,
Brittanee Bland-Masi, Marcus Jones, David Leveille, Luis Mancheno, Tom Miller, Paige Munro,
Andrew Rogers, and Jessica Stanford for excellent research assistance.
1. See infra, notes 74-85, and accompanying text.
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pharmaceutical, and medical industries have vilified the civil jury, one
of America's most democratic institutions. They claim that jurors take
psychological shortcuts, rely on heuristics, and are overly influenced by
their emotions and biases, resulting in a world of "jackpot justice" that
deters innovation, prompts defensive medicine, and hamstrings
economic growth.2 This campaign has yielded notable successes, as
friendly legislators, often recipients of largess from deep pocket
industries, have succeeded in passing a wide range of laws that curtail
plaintiffs' rights.3
With a dwindling number of lawyers in state and federal legislatures, 4
important changes have been adopted by public officials with little first-
hand knowledge of what is actually happening in the civil justice
system. Instead, proponents of tort reform recycle examples that range
from the laughably unrepresentative (a claim seeking $10 million for
being shown sleeping during a nationally telecast baseball game) 6 to the
superficially accurate but altogether misleading (the florid media reports
that McDonald's had to pay millions of dollars to a klutz who spilled hot
coffee on herself-though the judge dramatically cut the award and the
final settlement was much lower).7 Meanwhile, strategic payments from
companies and think tanks have underwritten the research of leading
academics, providing a patina of intellectual propriety to the pro-
2. Valerie P. Hans, Empowering the Active Jury: A Genuine Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 39, 40 (2008). See also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 34 (2000) ("[J]uries are
perceived as an almost lawless threat, bent on exercising their prejudices and inflicting undeserved
losses upon unpopular defendants.").
3. See infra Part II. These same forces have stepped up efforts to use corporate cash to elect
pro-business judges or remove judges deemed sympathetic to plaintiffs. Jonathan D. Glater, To the
Trenches: The Tort War Is Raging On, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/business/22tort.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0. See also infra notes
84-87 and accompanying text.
4. The percentage of legislative officeholders who have legal training has declined
precipitously, at both the federal and state level. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution: The Declining Influence of Lawyer-Statesman Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5 NEV. L. J.
479, 483-85 (2004-05); Dorothy Gambrell, The 113th Congress, by the Numbers, BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01 - 10/the-I 13th-congress-by-the-numbers;
Legislators' Occupations in All States, 1976, 1986, 1993, 1995, 2007 (Percentages), NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ legisdata/legislator-
occupations-national-data.aspx (last visited May 20, 2015).
5. See David A. Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 43 (2007)
("Generally, courts are better equipped than legislatures to see what is really wrong with tort law. Courts
are more likely to understand how it can best be fixed, and to appreciate how a doctrinal change is likely
to affect the actual course of litigation and adjudication.").
6. Elliot Hannon, Yankees Fan Caught on Camera Sleeping During Game Sues ESPN for
Defamation, SLATE, July 7, 2014, available at http://www.slate.com/
blogs/the_slatest/2014/07/07/fan caught-sleeping-during gamessues.espnmlb.html.
7. William McCann, William Haltom & Anne Bloom, Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical
Icon, 56 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 113, 130 (2001).
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business agenda of their funders.
8
One thoughtful observer concluded that much public debate consists
of "urban legend mixed with the occasional true story, supported by
selective references to academic studies [... ] repeated so often that even
the mythmakers forget the exaggeration, half-truth, and outright
misinformation employed." 9 Indeed, in sharp contrast to such anecdotes
is the large body of evidence from many reliable sources that reveals a
system that is working reasonably well, but that gets little attention in
the media and legislatures. 10
Many of these changes to the common law are blunt instruments that
fly in the face of cardinal tenets of our civil justice system-that each
plaintiff and each injury is unique and that proof of liability should
result in full compensation for the injuries that a culpable defendant
caused to this plaintiff.11 Indeed, the "make-whole" requirement,
including a full award for noneconomic damages (pain-and-suffering), is
central to the American tort system. 12  A very common legislative
reform-the damage cap--is also the most serious violator of this
principle. Other changes however, especially the evisceration of joint
and several liability and the collateral source rule, also have undercut the
bedrock principles of deterrence, corrective justice, and full
8. Thomas 0. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and the Integrity of Sponsored Law and
Economics Research, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 51 (2010) (recounting the successful efforts of
corporate defendants to undermine judicial support for punitive damages by funding the research of
leading academics, and defunding research which disagreed). The resulting reports were roundly
criticized by other academics. STEPHANIE MENCIMER, BLOCKING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR 231-35
(2006).
9. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 1 (2005). See also Anthony J. Sebok,
Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1504 (2007) (book review) ("[E]ven quality
newspapers distort the world of torts in a way that helps reinforce the anecdotes and generalizations
promoted by the tort reformers."); MENCIMER, supra note 8, at 7 ("The vast majority of the reporting on
the civil justice system has been lazy and gullible.").
10. Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV.
375, 379 (2011) ("A rich and continually expanding literature" reveals "substantial relationships
between the strength of the trial evidence and jury verdicts, powerful linear relationships between the
severity of a plaintiffs injury and the eventual jury damage award, and strong ... relationships between
compensatory damage awards and punitive damage awards.").
11. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (2d ed.
2011) [hereinafter DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS]. See also John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Convergence and Contrast in Torts Scholarship: An Essay in Honor of Robert Rabin, 61 DEPAUL L.
REV. 467, 470-71 (2012) (discussing tort law's commitment to "individualized treatment of accidents
and compensation," manifest in the goal of "make-whole" compensation adjudicated by juries with
broad discretion, as well as the requirement that the plaintiff prove that this defendant caused her injury)
(emphasis in original).
12. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 11, at 482; Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of
Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and Remedies, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 444-45 (2011). 1 use the term
"make whole" as shorthand for the more technically correct, but awkward, "put the plaintiff back as
close as possible to her pre-injury condition." See Sean Hannon Williams, Lost Life and Life Projects,
87 IND. L.J. 1745, 1763 (2012).
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compensation that undergird the tort system, with the result of under-
compensation for many seriously injured plaintiffs. 3
That being said, there are examples where our tort system,
characterized by open-ended principles that grant substantial discretion
to a lay jury, has resulted in large, sometimes huge, damage awards that
are difficult to justify. These examples have understandably created
anger and confusion, especially for those people and institutions (like
physicians and product manufacturers) whose core activities regularly
create substantial levels of risk, and thus expose them to large damage
claims for bad outcomes. 14 The challenge is figuring out how to weed
out the unjustifiable awards while providing full compensation to the
seriously injured and deterring unreasonably dangerous future conduct.
While tort reform has been critiqued from a number of angles, this
piece focuses on the institutional capacity of the three branches of
government to control jury excess. It concludes that the judiciary is in
the best position to shape the civil justice system. It is judges,
overseeing the work of juries, who for centuries have used the
incremental law-making of the common law method to monitor, and
when necessary adjust, the blend of legal standards and rules that reflect
the current needs of society. There is no guarantee that relying upon
judges will always yield different outcomes than those reached by a
legislature. Rather, I make a process argument, preferring law-making
through adjudication because it is better-informed, characterized by
stronger limits on access to decision makers, and less influenced by
moneyed entreaties. Moreover, changes to how the civil justice system
handles tort claims are best made at the state level, where judges are
more attuned to the needs of the individual state than are Congress or
the Supreme Court of the United States.
This Article first discusses the current state of tort reform, which has
had its primary loci in the legislative and executive branches, before
13. See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 329, 329-30 (2007) (discussing rationales for the tort system); W. Kip Viscusi &
Patricia Bom, Medical Insurance in the Wake of Liability Reform, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 463, 465 (1995)
("[A] rigid damages cap.., on noneconomic damages will.., limit awards to more deserving victims,
such as the catastrophically injured."). See also John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of State
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J. 524, 528-29
(2005) (summarizing the harsh impact of the Virginia medical malpractice cap on compensatory
damages). Not all of the reforms to the civil justice system in recent decades have favored defendants,
with the move from contributory negligence to comparative fault being a prime counter-example, albeit
sometimes a result accomplished via courts using common law analysis. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at
504.
14. See e.g., Sample List of Members, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N,
http://www.atra.org/about/sample-members (last visited June 12, 2014) (listing members of the
American Tort Reform Association, a leading champion of the tort reform sought by physicians,
manufacturers, and insurance companies).
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turning to a discussion of the strengths of juries and judges, and the
many tools well-suited, some time-tested and some novel, to render
case-by-case justice. 15 It then concludes that having more, rather than
less, faith in the judiciary is the best way to guarantee justice in the civil
justice system.
II. OF MYTHS AND MEAT CLEAVERS: LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
TORT REFORM
Professor Richard Abel well summarized the tort reform battles of
recent decades.
Insurers and well-organized repeat-player defendants have waged a
costly and deceptive campaign over several decades-with media
complicity-to disseminate the myths that Americans file large
numbers of frivolous cases and juries are excessively generous to
victims.... Insurers and well-organized defendants ... have used
their political muscle to persuade legislators to give them special
protection from liability." 1
6
The spate of laws intended to reduce the power of civil juries and to
reduce the possibility of an injured plaintiff recovering full
compensation for injuries can be organized into three categories:
changes to procedure, changes to substantive law, and limits on
available remedies. 17
A. Pro-defendant Changes to Procedure
In recent decades, legislatures have changed important aspects of the
procedural landscape of the civil justice system, imposing an array of
procedural barriers to plaintiffs getting their day in court. 8 At the
federal level, the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which resulted
from "an extended and well-organized political campaign,"'19 makes it
15. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 3 ("Tort law is still largely common law; courts made it, and
they can unmake it.").
16. Richard L. Abel, Judges Write the Darndest Things: Judicial Mystification of Limitations on
Tort Liability, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1548-49 (2002) (citations omitted).
17. In significant measure, this concerted attack on the civil justice system has grown out of the
work of the "Tort Policy Working Group" early in the administration of President Ronald Regan. JAY
M. FEINMAN, UNMAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW 25-
27 (2004).
18. Procedural changes can have serious impacts on the ability of plaintiffs to obtain
compensation. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice
Claims, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 671, 676 (2014).
19. Edward R. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1823, 1823 (2008).
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much harder for injured individuals to have access to the significant
efficiencies provided by the state class action vehicle and the advantages
of the less pro-business judiciary found in many states.20  The early
returns from this single but important procedural change have rewarded
the business interests that made this a legislative priority, as there has
been a marked decline in class action filings (although less change in
personal injury class actions). 2' CAFA is but one example of the
procedural changes that have limited access to justice, the others
involving decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States that
tighten pleading requirements for all civil actions,22 limit the ability of
plaintiffs to introduce expert testimony, z3 and a string of other pro-
business decisions 24 that have made it more difficult for citizens to take
advantage of laws that were enacted to protect them.25
20. See Stephen Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008) (the act was part of a Republican tort reform
effort that featured "unrelenting attacks on lawyers in general and plaintiffs' lawyers in particular").
21. See Nicole Ochi, Are Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead - Complex Litigation
Strategies after CAFA and MMTJA, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 974 n.70 (2008). See also An
Assessment of CAFA and the Future of Class Action Reform, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL,
Jan. 1, 2013 (2013 WL 1265755) (reporting that State Farm Insurance has seen class action filings drop
by almost two thirds post-CAFA); John Beisner et al., CAFA Update: The Class Action Jurisdictional
World Clarifies, in PRIVATE OIL & GAS ROYALTIES: THE LATEST TRENDS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND
CHALLENGES IN OIL & GAS ROYALTY LITIGATION (2008) ("corporate counsel should continue to report
fewer class actions overall"). The Supreme Court of the United States recently read CAFA narrowly in
litigation brought by state governments pursuant to the parens patriae power. State of Miss. ex rel Hood
v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (because of CAFA, a consumer protection class action
brought by the Mississippi Attorney General cannot be removed to federal court even if there were more
than 100 Mississippi citizens who would benefit from the litigation).
22. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013)
(identifying pro-business developments that combine to significantly decrease the chance of a citizen to
have her "day in court"). See generally Louis W. Hensler, I11, Class Counsel, Self-Interest and Other
People's Money, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 53, 64-65 (2004) (hostility to class actions, especially on the part
of federal judges, has made it "a steep uphill climb to certify any products liability class action").
23. See David E. Bemstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 44 (2013) (courts now employ "stricter scrutiny of expert testimony" and
have imposed "relatively stringent criteria for scrutinizing expert testimony"). Daubert is discussed in
more detail infra, notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
24. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Inching to Right: But without Giving that Impression, USA
TODAY, July 1, 2013, at A6 (the current Supreme Court "has been more pro-business than the average
Supreme Court over the last 50 years," quoting leading appellate advocate Neal Katyal); Adam Liptak,
Roberts Pulls Supreme Court to the Right Step by Step, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/Roberts-plays-a-long-game.html (the 2012-13 term
"cement[ed] its legacy as the most pro-business court in the modem era," quoting Professor Lee Epstein,
who tracks the Supreme Court).
25. The National Conference of State Legislatures pointed out how laws that push cases out of
the state system and into the federal system raise serious federalism concerns: These laws adversely
impact the availability of "state laws in the areas of consumer protection and antitrust, which were
passed to protect the citizens of a particular state against fraudulent or illegal activities, [and now] will
almost never be heard in state courts. Ironically, state courts, whose sole purpose is to interpret state
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In addition to changes that make it harder for plaintiffs' lawyers to
take advantage of the efficiencies of pursuing group claims via class
actions in state court,26 there are now more onerous requirements that a
plaintiff must satisfy before filing an action seeking damages for
medical malpractice. 27 Physicians, hospitals, and insurance companies
have stressed the importance of medical care to focus legislative
attention on their corner of the civil justice system. Some of these laws
require plaintiffs to initially pursue alternative dispute resolution (often
in the form of an exhaustion requirement, a benefit traditionally limited
to government defendants), but the ones with the most bite require
binding arbitration (delaying or sometimes eliminating any chance of a
jury verdict), again with no demonstrable effect on insurance rates, but
delaying the ability of patients to receive compensation. 28  These
reforms have had a dramatic impact upon a plaintiffs ability to obtain
compensation for medical misconduct.29
Additionally, some states require that a civil complaint be
accompanied by an affidavit from a qualified expert that. supports the
plaintiffs theory of liability (again, mostly in medical malpractice
actions),3 ° or that a complaint be adjudicated by experts in the field
rather than a lay jury. 31
laws, will be bypassed and the federal judiciary will be asked to render judgment in those cases." Letter
from Michael Blaboni to the Majority and Minority Leaders from National Association of Attorneys
General, 151 Cong. Rec. 2650 (Feb. 16, 2005). See also JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex
Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REv. 717, 719 (2004)
(criticizing "strategy of creating federal tort law though the guise of regulating procedure," in violation
of the Erie doctrine).
26. An array of state laws limit the availability of class actions under state law. See Brief for
Respondent apps. A-B, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct, 1431 (2010)
(listing federal and state statutes that limit the remedy available in a class action, as well as
representative state statutes prohibiting class actions for particular claims).
27. Joshua M. Koppel, Comment, Tailoring Discovery: Using Nontranssubstantive Rules to
Reduce Waste and Abuse, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 243, 265 (2012). See also David Marcus, The Past,
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 371,402-03
(2010) (noting that changes to procedure can impact substantive outcomes in tort cases).
28. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: An Update and
Assessment, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. 1, 26-28 (2013) (reviewing legislative changes that make recovery
for medical negligence more difficult and reporting that many of the reforms have neither reduced
insurance premiums nor improved medical care). See generally Phillip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries,
105 MICH. L. REv. 1453 (2007) (describing proposals to replace juries with "expert" decision-makers,
like panels of medical professionals).
29. Gilles, supra note 18, at 690.
30. See Medical Liability/Medical Malpractice Laws, NAT'L CON. OF STATE LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-medical-malpractice-
laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 15, 2011) (identifying states that have adopted pre-filing requirements).
31. Peters, supra note 28 (describing proposals to replace juries with "expert" decision-makers,
like panels of medical professionals). See also Ellen Wertheimer, Calling it a Leg Doesn't Make it a
Leg: Doctors, Lawyers, and Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 154, 183 (2008). For a
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Another significant curtailment of plaintiffs' rights is the widespread
adoption of statutes of repose, which provide greater temporal certainty
for defendants than traditional statutes of limitation, but can snuff out
causes of action before a person even knows that he or she has been
injured.32 Again, these harsh changes have been the result of special
interest lobbying on behalf of repeat players in the civil justice system
like physicians and product manufacturers, but some states have gone
further and added architects and builders to the list of favored actors.
33
Finally, some states have taken a more indirect approach: Limiting
the availability of contingent fees for certain types of cases (again,
typically medical malpractice), making it less likely that lawyers will be
willing or able to subsidize litigation against deep-pocket defendants.
34
B. Pro-defendant Changes to Substantive Tort Law
State tort law has also been undermined by what has been termed
"silent" or "stealth tort reform." Beginning in the 1980s and
accelerating during the administration of President George W. Bush, the
doctrine of preemption has used federal regulation to bar injured people
from taking advantage of state law remedies.35 The primary target of
executive branch action seeking to oust state law has been
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, on the view that regulation by the
FDA prevents state courts from imposing "additional, inconsistent"
requirements.36 This was a reversal of decades of federal understanding
federalism-based critique of such provisions, see Benjamin Grossberg, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort
Reform: The Erie Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
217 (2010).
32. Unlike a statute of limitation, which typically does not begin to run until a person knows or
should have known of a wrongful act, a statute of repose begins to run from a date certain, like the
purchase of a product, and thus may extinguish a cause of action before a plaintiff has any inkling of
being a victim of misconduct. DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at § 219. While statutes of repose
are often considered "substantive" for the purposes of conflicts of laws analysis, they are discussed here
because they do not change a plaintiffs prima facie case. See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in
Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L. REV. 1, 44 (2005).
33. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 557-58. See also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY
CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 165 (2008) (no evidence
that statutes of repose have reduced litigation); Owen, supra note 32, at 42-43.
34. See Lee Harris & Jennifer Longo, Flexible Tort Reform, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 61,
79-84 (2007) (discussing limits on contingent fees adopted in various states).
35. David C. Vladek, Deconstructing Wyeth v. Levine: The New Limits on Implied Conflict
Preemption, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883 (2009).
36. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption, 15
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 359, 360 (2014) ("Federal preemption of state law can hamper the
promotion of health and safety."); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies
and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227-28 (2007) (identifying efforts by the
Food and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration to block state tort claims and predicting "a future where federal agency
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regarding the scope of federal administrative power, in addition to
virtually all case law.37 In general, preemption arguments have a mixed
track record, but overall they have closed the doors of state courthouses
to thousands of injured people. 38  Less well-known are the efforts to
circumvent congressional will via executive orders.39
Also noteworthy are the legislative efforts to shield specific
defendants-again, typically in the products liability context-from
civil liability. For example, in response to the creative lawyering that
led to huge settlements of claims against the tobacco industry, special
statutory protections were sought, and often obtained, to shield
manufacturers of handguns, biomaterials, and even purveyors of fast
food, from damages actions.4 °
Finally, legislatures have codified particular judge-made doctrines
that limit liability, restricting or in some cases short-circuiting the ability
of the courts to use the common law process to revisit old rules in new
contexts.4 1
regulations come armed with directives that displace competing or conflicting state regulations or
common law as a matter of course."). See also James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's
Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
939, 963 (2008).
37. Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption. Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C.
L. REv. 1089, 1090 (2007). This politically motivated reversal represents a textbook example of the
"regulatory capture" that comes when the regulators and the regulated have employees moving back and
forth. See Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device
Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51, 87 (2005).
38. Compare Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (FDA's premarket approval process
for medical devices preempted state common law claims for negligence, strict liability, and implied
warranty) with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (FDA Act does not bar state law claim of
improper drug labeling). See generally Michael P. Moreland, Preemption as Inverse Negligence Per Se,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1249 (2013): Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2013).
39. Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 526-31 (2012)
(discussing how various executive orders that attempt to limit federal intrusion into state regulatory
prerogatives have not had uniform success).
40. See, e.g., Biomedical Access Assurance Act of 1998, 21 U.S.C. § 1604; Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03; 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2005). See also Cara L.
Wilking & Richard A. Daynard, Beyond Cheeseburgers: The Impact of Commonsense Consumption
Acts on Future Obesity-Related Lawsuits, 68 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 229, 230 (2013) (listing state
"Commonsense Consumption Laws" that ban obesity-related lawsuits).
41. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60 DEPAUL L.
REV. 539, 567-68 (2011) ("A number of states have also codified existing liability rules, a reform that
does not reduce liability but nevertheless reduces legal ambiguity by preventing courts from further
expanding liability through the exercise of their common law authority."). See also David A. Logan,
When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the "Flagrant Trespasser, " 37 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1463-67 (2011) (describing the common law process).
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C. Pro-defendant Changes to Remedies
The most frequent tactic of tort reformers has been to place limits
upon the historical ability of juries to award a full measure of
compensatory damages. Most states have passed legislation that caps
the amount a plaintiff may recover as compensation, regardless of the
seriousness of the harm suffered.42 This has occurred despite the fact
that a core purpose of the tort system is to provide the injured plaintiff a
full measure of damages in order to "make him whole. 4 4 Such changes
are draconian, especially to those most seriously injured.44 Recognizing
this fundamental unfairness, some state courts have held that damage
caps violate state constitutional rights.45
Tort reformers have also successfully campaigned to limit both the
size and availability of punitive damages, the non-compensatory remedy
intended to punish a defendant for egregious misconduct, and to provide
a strong measure of deterrence, both general and specific, to such
conduct in the future.46 Even though there is abundant data that such
awards occur infrequently in personal injury actions (and that when they
do occur the awards are often dramatically reduced by judges),47
lobbyists for pro-business groups have mounted a sophisticated multi-
pronged attack to change both statutory law and long-standing common
42. DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at § 486. Some states cap all compensatory damages,
while a majority only caps non-economic damages. Id. A survey of empirical data shows that caps on
noneconomic damages disproportionally reduce the size of tort judgments to women. Joanna M.
Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55
UCLA L. REV. 905, 945-49 (2008).
43. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[T]he law of torts attempts
primarily to put an injured person as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort."). For
a discussion of some of the complications raised by this "compensation principle," see Mark A.
Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 275-84 (2008).
44. DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at § 468. As a practical matter, caps require the most
seriously injured to bear losses above the cap amount, allowing the insurer to avoid those same losses.
Damage caps have also been shown to correlate positively with poorer patient outcomes and a
disproportionate impact on recoveries by women plaintiffs. Shepherd, supra note 42, at 945-49.
45. A recent example is Florida. See McCall v. United States, 134 So.2d 894 (Fla.) (2014)
(statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions
violates the right to equal protection under state constitution). See also J. Chase Bryan, et al., Are Non-
Economic Caps Constitutional?, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 154 (2013) (surveying states). Empirical evidence
also suggests that caps have not reduced the damages actually awarded to injured plaintiffs; Catherine
M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391,
391-92 (2005).
46. DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at § 468. See also Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) ("This Court has long made clear that '[plunitive damages may properly be
imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition."') (internal quotation and citation omitted).
47. Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications
for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 165-66 (2002).
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law principles.48
Legislative changes to the common law of punitive damages have
raised the level of proof of wrongdoing that the plaintiff must introduce
(from "preponderance" to "clear and convincing"); specified, and often
circumscribed, the type of wrongful behavior subject to a punitive
award; bifurcated the determination of liability from the amount of
damages; restricted the ability of the jury to be informed of the
defendant's net worth; and, finally, capped the total punitive award that
may be imposed. 49 Not all of these reforms have withstood judicial
scrutiny, as a number of state courts found them inconsistent with
provisions of state constitutions.5 °
Perhaps the most significant-and certainly the most-publicized-
change to the law of punitive damages has been the success of a
sustained, well-funded, and decades-long campaign to have the Supreme
Court of the United States limit the ability of juries to award punitive
damages. 51 This campaign, which included the controversial tactic of
paying for, and then relying upon the resulting scholarship, 52 has borne
fruit: 53 the Court has recognized both procedural and substantive due
process limits on punitive awards. Emblematic of this campaign is the
reversal of a multi-billion dollar punitive award imposed upon Exxon
for the catastrophic oil spill in Valdez Bay, Alaska, despite
acknowledging that in general juries award punitives with "overall
restraint." 5 The decision inches the Court closer to granting corporate
America's goal of requiring a 1-to-1 relationship between the
compensatory and punitive award,55 and because of federal supremacy,
48. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, March 16, 2008, at
MM38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html?pagewanted=all.
49. See, e.g., David A. Logan & Wayne A. Logan, NORTH CAROLINA TORTS § 8.40 (2003)
(discussing the changes to the common law of punitive dames imposed by the North Carolina "Act to
Establish Standards and Procedures for the Recovery of Punitive Damages in Civil Actions").
50. DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at § 468.
51. For a fascinating description of one aspect of this effort-the development of an elite cadre
of highly skilled and experienced advocates who specialize in Supreme Court advocacy on behalf of
wealthy corporate clients-and how it has yielded a string of important victories, see Richard J. Lazarus,
Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court. Transforming the Court by Transforming the
Bar, 96 GEO. L. J. 1487 (2008).
52. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 417, 501 n.17 (2008) (Court declines to rely
upon empirical studies of jury behavior, and the resulting law review articles, "[b]ecause this research
was funded in part by Exxon."). See also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction
to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 129, 272-79 (2003-04) (criticizing scholarship that is beholden to pro-business interests).
53. See Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83 (2007)
(discussing cases).
54. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 501-02 (punitive damage awards in maritime cases must satisfy a I-
to-I ratio; Court expresses no opinion on whether such a ratio is also compelled by the Constitution).
55. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wyeth LLC v. Schofield, 2011 WL 1155235 (U.S. Mar.
24, 2011) (No. 10-1177); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Holiday Inn Franchising, Inc. v. Hotel
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locks in protections for corporate defendants unable to get protection via
state legislation. 56
Another modification to traditional tort law has been legislative
changes to one of the most important guarantors of full compensation:
the doctrine of joint and several liability.57 For decades, a defendant
whose misconduct merged with that of another culpable actor was
deemed liable for all of the damage, allowing a plaintiff to receive full
compensation even if a co-defendant was judgment-proof. Now, in
most states, a plaintiff will not receive full compensation for his injury
because an institutional co-defendant (often the only party with
sufficient assets or insurance to satisfy a jury award) is only liable for its
share of the damages. 58
Similarly, many seriously injured plaintiffs no longer have the
protection of the collateral source rule, which precluded a windfall to a
defendant when a plaintiff had the good fortune to have first-party
insurance or some other source that reduced his actual out-of-pocket
expenses for medical care. 59  Finally, some states have made it
impossible for a seriously injured plaintiff to receive full compensation
for their injuries in a timely manner by allowing the defendant to pay
out the award over a legislatively-determined period of years. 60
In sum, the confluence of the political influence of repeat-player
defendants and their allies in the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches has resulted in significant, and in some cases, unfair changes to
many long-recognized and important aspects of the tort system. Part III
argues that widespread legislative and executive incursions into the tort
system should be scrapped in favor of the having those closest to the
civil justice system-judges-monitor jury performance and, when
necessary, use the common law method to make incremental
adjustments to the procedural, substantive, and remedial law of our civil
justice system.
Franchises, Inc., 2012 WL 405461 (U.S. Feb. 6, 2012) (No. 11-974).
56. Jeff Kerr, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Perils of Judicial Punitive Damages Reform, 59
EMORY L. J. 727, 734 (2010).
57. See Alexee Deep Conroy, Note, Lessons Learned from the "Laboratories of Democracy": A
Critique of Federal Medical Malpractice Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1179 (2006).
58. This often results in both under compensation and under deterrence. See Geistfeld, supra
note 41, at 568.
59. Conroy, supra note 57, at 1179-80. See also Collateral Source Rule Reform, AM. TORT
REFORM ASS'N, http://www.atra.org/issues/collateral-source-rule-reform (last visited June 12, 2014).
60. Such "periodic payment" plans have been adopted in 30 states. See Ronen Avraham,
Database of State Tort Law Reforms (5th ed., U. Tex. L., L. and Econ. Research Paper No. e555, May
2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid--9027 l#PaperDownload.
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III. JURIES, JUDGES, AND TORT REFORM
A. Why Juries
One of the most distinctive aspects of the American legal system is
the role of the jury, especially in civil cases. Even in other common law
countries, decision-making by laypeople is usually limited to criminal
trials. 61  Juries reflect the evolution of our ancestral system of
government away from law as a tool of the divine, to a tool of the
secular.62  Indeed, the role of juries in civil cases was considered by
William Blackstone to be "the glory of the English law" and "the most
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, that he not be
affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by
unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and equals." 63  John
Adams identified the crucial link between juries and democracy:
"Representative government and trial by jury are the heart and lungs of
liberty. Without them we have no other fortification against being
ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and
clothed like swine and hounds."64
The civil jury was considered so crucial to the Framers of the
Constitution that it was enshrined in the Seventh Amendment,65 and a
similar right is recognized in all states. 66  In the modem era, Chief
Justice Warren Burger, no fan of jury trials, nevertheless observed:
"Jury trial is one of the institutions we borrowed from England, an
almost sacred part of our constitutional heritage, and an article of
faith."67 Akhil Amar concluded that the jury system "summed up-
61. William Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation
of Written Contracts, 2001 WIsc. L. REV. 931, 931.
62. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 413 (1930).
63. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379. See also W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging
Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 795 (2005) ("In the torts arena particularly, the jury's
predominance began even earlier, perhaps as early as the fifteenth century.").
64. JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 302 (1996) (citation omitted). See also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 274 (2000) ("Juries, especially civil juries, instill some of the habits of the judicial mind into
every citizen, and just those habits are the very best way of preparing people to be free.").
65. The absence of a guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases was a basis for Antifederalist
opposition to the Constitution. Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension
Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 972 (2012). James Madison, the drafter of the Seventh Amendment
wrote: "Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a social compact,
which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any
one of the pre-existent rights of nature." See 1 Annals of Cong. 454 (1789).
66. Elizabeth Thomberg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. REs. 181, 183.
67. Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205, 207-08 (1985). The
Chief Justice criticized modem juries in large measure because they do not reflect a cross-section of the
community and because its members are ill-equipped to understand the complex issues often presented.
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indeed embodied-the ideals of populism, federalism, and civic virtue
that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights. 68
Besides being an important aspect of the rights asserted by
independence-era Americans, there are a number of additional
institutional justifications for the centrality of the civil jury.
1. Juries Provide Checks and Balances on Government
At base, juries protect citizens from "the abuse of power of
legislatures, judges, the government, business, or other powerful
entities." 69  Through its power to render verdicts, juries serve a
"checking function" on government actors: Checking judges when the
jury is asked to apply the common law, and checking legislatures and
the executive when applying statutes. In this way, the jury is a
"meliorator of harshness or dispenser of equity" when the application of
the law to specific facts is fundamentally unfair in particular cases. 7 °
And, because juries are drawn from a constantly changing group of
citizens, representing a cross-section of the populace, the egalitarian
members of the venire serve a function analogous to that of the United
States House of Representatives, drawn from 435 districts tied to
population, when it "checks" the elitist Senate.71
Indeed, no other institution of our government places so much power
in the hands of ordinary citizens. By applying the law to facts, juries
serve as "mini-legislators," making decisions that have the sanction of
government authority and are binding on parties, even the government.72
This "gamble" reflects a commitment to the core concept that in a
Id.
68. Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190 (1991). See
generally Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury's Role in the Structure of our Government, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241 (2014) (detailing how the civil jury is a "structural element in American
government"). The civil jury is rare outside of the United States. J. Mark Ramseyer, Liability for
Defective Products: Comparative Hypotheses and Evidence from Japan, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 652
(2013).
69. AM. BAR AsS'N & BROOKINGS INST., CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 9
(1992).
70. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 35.
71. George Washington is said to have likened the Senate to a saucer into which one poured
one's hot tea to let it cool before returning it to the cup. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 285 (1996).
72. "The lay jury is empowered to make binding decisions on the relevant facts in a way
inconsistent with the preferences of a government official (the judge) as well as other 'experts' in the
legislative and executive branches, [resulting in] a form of direct democracy." OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW,
CULTURE AND RITUAL 55-56 (2005). See also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Jury and Participatory
Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2014) ("Indeed, the jury provides one element of
ordinary common sense in a system governed by experts, a melody of populism in an institution
otherwise dominated by the harmony of elites.").
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democracy true power resides in the individual, and stands in sharp
contrast to the mediated democracy reflected in such arrangements as
the Electoral College and the disproportionate representation provided
small states in the United States Senate.73
2. Juries are Independent
State and federal legislators operate in a system of privately financed
election campaigns, which invites the strategic use of money to
influence outcomes.74  As a corollary, wealthy individuals and
institutions have always played a disproportionate role in our
government. 75  This phenomenon accelerated at a seminal moment in
1971, when leading corporate lawyer Lewis Powell (before his
appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States) authored a
lengthy memo to the Chamber of Commerce, setting out a blueprint for
a multi-faceted strategy to protect business interests from attacks by
consumer advocates. He recommended that corporations and corporate
leaders become more involved in both the political and the legal
arenas,76 and in the ensuing four decades, corporate America has spent
tens of millions of dollars attempting to hamstring the ability of the
executive branch to regulate directly, and to constrain the ability of the
civil justice system to regulate indirectly. 77
One contemporary embodiment of Powell's strategy is the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), heavily funded by large
corporations and affiliated pro-business individuals and groups.
78
73. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
1-2 (2000). (The jury can also be viewed as a "harbinger of the democratic era... one of the first
definite breaks between divine and secular dispensation.").
74. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARv. L. REV. 118, 126 (2010).
75. See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance
Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (2008) (tracing history of efforts to control the influence of money in
American politics). See generally OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST: AN ABRIDGED
EDITION (Helmut Weiner & Arthur Helps eds., Charles Francis Atkinson trans., 1932) (noting that an
increased influence of money in political life has historically played a role in the decline of societies).
76. Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Charman,
Education Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971) (transcription available at
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/powell.memo lewis/) (recognizing the need to change public perceptions
of corporate America, via "eminent scholars writers and speakers" publishing pro-business articles in
scholarly and mainstream publications, funding paid advertisements in the media, and taking bold steps
so that "political power... [is] assiduously cultivated").
77. See THOMAS 0. MCGARrrY, FREEDOM TO HARM 6 (2013) (detailing the "laissez faire
revival" of the past four decades and how "the business community and a handful of conservative
foundations seized the offensive by creating the idea and influence structures needed for a sustained
attack on the protective government infrastructure.").
78. Diane L. Fahey, The Movement to Destroy the Income Tax and the IRS: Wo Is Doing it and
Why they are Succeeding, 15 FLA. TAX. REV. 157, 193-94 (2014).
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ALEC drafts and then promotes model state legislation and then wines
and dines legislators (and their families) at ALEC conventions, held at
posh resorts. 79  This strategy has proven effective: Over 1,000 ALEC-
drafted model laws are introduced in state legislatures annually, with
almost 20% becoming law.80
Corporate spending in political campaigns is geared to influencing
electoral outcomes, and thereby influencing the output of government
branches, state and federal, legislative and executive. There are also
intimate ties between members of Congress and their staffs, and the law
firms and lobbyists that court them. Such coziness is a powerful
complement to aggressive and sophisticated lobbying that big money
purchases, and stacks the deck against the interests of individual
citizens.8 2  As a result, lawmaking at the state and national level, and
thus the disbursement of public goods, is subject to deep-pocket
influence, a condition likely to accelerate given the Citizens United
decision striking down important federal campaign giving restrictions.8 3
79. Most of the attention has focused on ALEC's role in creating model bills, drafted by
lobbyists working closely with allied lawmakers, which advance a pro-business, socially conservative
agenda. But it is also the case that special interests effectively turn ALEC's lawmaker members into
stealth lobbyists, providing them with talking points, signaling how they should vote, and collaborating
on bills affecting hundreds of issues like school vouchers and tobacco taxes. Mike McIntire,
Conservative Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobby, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at Al, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-a-tax-exempt-group-mixes-legislators-andlobbyists.
html?pagewanted=all. A study from 2012 concluded that the Virginia legislature passed 50 laws
promoted by ALEC, mostly word-for-word transcriptions. See The Big Money behind State Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/opinion/the-big-money-
behind-state-laws.html (summarizing report published by ProgressVA).
80. Allison Boldt, Rhetoric vs. Reality: ALEC's Disguise as a Nonprofit Despite its Extensive
Lobbying, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 35, 54 (2012). This problem is exacerbated by the
impotence of laws that are intended to prevent former members of Congress and their staffers from
cashing in on their connections by joining law firms and lobbying groups that seek to influence
legislation. See Eric Lipton, The Revolving Door: An Annotated Case Study, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2014,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/02/02/us/politics/O2revolving-door-
documents.html ("Since 2007, when Congress revised ethics rules, more than 1,600 House or Senate
staffmembers have registered to lobby in less than one year of their departure from Congress.").
81. See, e.g., Raquel Alexander et al., Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An
Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 25 J.L. & POL. 401, 441 (2009)
(estimating that the return on investment in political influence over tax policy matters to be as high as
22,000 percent). While labor unions and trial lawyers also give generously to favored candidates, the
total amounts are easily outstripped by pro-business contributions. See Zach Holden, Overview of
Campaign Finances, 2011-2012 Elections, FOLLOwTHEMONEY.ORG,
http://beta.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/overview-of-campaign-finances-20 112012-
elections/#section_5 (last visited July 13, 2014).
82. Hanoch Dagan, Political Money, 8 ELECTION L.J. 349, 359 (2009) ("From the perspective of
the people who use money to promote political causes, as well as from all other relevant angles, the
daily life of interest group politics between elections is indistinguishable from the more salient moments
of political campaigns."). See also Issacharoff, supra note 74, at 132, n.77 (corporations appear to
spend as much on lobbying the executive and legislative branches as upon elections).
83. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 335-36 (2010) (restrictions on
campaign expenditures by corporations and unions violate their First Amendment free speech rights).
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While it is generally recognized that officials in the legislative and
executive branches have become more dependent upon, and thus
responsive to, the influence of money, less-noticed by the public is the
impact upon the judicial branch, at least at the state level, of the
increasing frequency of million dollar judicial campaigns. 84  Almost
two-thirds of the states elect judges, and the cost of such campaigns has
soared. A study by the Brennan Center for Justice concluded that in the
2012 election cycle spending on television ads hit new highs, spending
by "independent" groups escalated, and national pressure groups were
increasingly involved in state judicial elections, especially in states with
supreme courts closely divided between liberals and conservatives.
This investment pays off: Judges who receive large contributions
from pro-business interests tend to rule in favor the positions of their
donors. 86  Pro-business interests have also reshaped the law by hiring
leading academics to generate "independent scholarship" that provides a
patina of scholarly legitimacy to amicus briefs in high-stakes
litigation.87
This ban was extended to state restrictions in American Tradition Partnership, Ltd. v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct.
2490 (2012), and to limits on how much an individual donor may contribute to candidates for federal
office, political parties, and political action committees in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
See also Derek Willis, Outside Groups Set Spending Record in Midterms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/1 1/upshot/outside-groups-set-spending-record-in-midterms-
.html?abt=0002&abg=0 (campaign spending has continued to accelerate).
84. JAMES SAMPLE, ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009: DECADE OF
CHANGE 5 (2010) (detailing that annual spending on judicial elections increased from $6 million in
1990 to over $45 million in 2008). See also DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2005) (describing modem trend of expensive, hard-
hitting judicial campaigns with focus on matters having little to do with actual job performance of
judges). The flood of money is going even further down the ballot. See Reid Wilson, Big Money
Partisanship Invades Quiet Realm of Secretary of State Elections, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2014, at A02,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/big-money-partisanship-invades-quiet-realm-of-
secretary-of-state-elections/2014/03/11/62e2f4e6-a941-11 e3-8599-ce7295b6851 c.story.html (detailing
how PACs are pouring money into races for Secretary of State because that the traditionally low profile
office may play an important role in hot button issues, like voter-identification initiatives).
85. See ALICIA BANNON, ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2011-12 (2013).
See also JED H. SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND JUDICIAL
POWER IN AMERICA (2011) (detailing the influence of corporate money on the court system).
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the influence of money in
judicial elections must be limited. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding
that a $3 million campaign contribution to a successful judicial candidate who refused to recuse and
later ruled in favor of the contributor violated federal due process protections).
86. Jed H. Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review,
123 HARv. L. REV. 1063, 1064-65 (2010) ("Studies have shown that elected judges disproportionately
rule in favor of their campaign contributors."); Anderson, supra note 5, at 7 (empirical evidence shows
that a Texas Supreme Court majority elected with the support of the business community held for the
defendants 87% of the time in tort cases).
87. See Bob Sloan, ALEC, the Koch Led CABAL & "The Amicus Project" - Fed Court
Interference, DAILY KOS (July 24, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/07/24/1103641/-ALEC-
the-Koch-Led-CABAL-The-Amicus-Project-Fed-Court-lnterference# (describing the Amicus Project
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The civil jury requires corporations to play on a level playing field, a
position to which they are not accustomed. 88  The jury selection
process 89 and the rules of evidence prevent direct manipulations by
sophisticated, deep-pocketed pleaders once in trial. 90  While
corporations and trade groups have saturated the airwaves and print
media with pro-corporate and anti-plaintiff advertising, they at least
cannot similarly engage with citizens on a jury once a judicial
proceeding begins, so that the jury remains relatively impervious to
direct corporatist entreaties. 91  In this sense, the jury still reflects the
colonial notion of direct democracy, in which important public decisions
made by citizens "unbossed and unbought."
92
funded by ALEC). Perhaps the most notorious use of academics was funding provided to Cass Sunstein
and Kip Viscusi, which ended up in briefs paid for by Exxon that successfully advocated federal
constitutional limits on punitive damages. See also Shireen A. Barday, Note, Punitive Damages,
Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61 STAN. L. REv. 711 (2008).
88. Sheldon Whitehouse, The Dwindling Civil Jury, NAT. L.J., June 30, 2013, at 30. Indeed, this
exercise of populism is consistent with the view of the Framers: "The Anti-Federalists' insistence on the
Seventh Amendment was driven in significant part by a desire to protect debtors from the creditors in
the big cities. According to this view, the pharmaceutical companies or auto manufacturers of the early
twenty-first century are the big-city creditors of the late eighteenth century." Jason M. Solomon, The
Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L. J. 1331, 1345-46 (2012).
89. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (citation
omitted) ("One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact-'a jury capable and willing to decide
the case solely on the evidence before it.' Voir dire examination serves to protect that right by exposing
possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors."). See also Richard J.
Crawford & Daniel W. Patterson, Exploring and Expanding Voir Dire Boundaries.: A Note to Judges
and Trial Lawyers, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645, 646 (1997) ("First, voir dire exists for one
straightforward and simple reason: to provide a screening step in the litigation process which will reduce
the possibility of disputes being resolved by citizens whose backgrounds, attitudes or predispositions
may interfere with a fair and impartial resolution of those disputes.").
90. A trial involves "rational fact-finding within the framework of the substantive law," with the
determination of relevant facts done without consideration of "irrelevant" evidence that could mislead
the trier of fact. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 2.1 (2d ed. 1987).
This goal is implemented through application of the rules of evidence, most importantly FRE 401
(defining "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence") and FRE 403 (calling for the exclusion of evidence if its "probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury"). Id.
91. Corporations and their allies have tried to influence prospective jurors through sophisticated
and at times pervasive advertising campaigns portraying the civil justice system as bankrupting
businesses and local governments. Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform:
Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L. J. 447, 451 (2004) (discussing the public
relations campaigns used to prejudice the jury pool against plaintiff claims); F. Patrick Hubbard, The
Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform " Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 437, 455 (2006) ("Because it
is composed of lay persons and because of its ad hoc, for-this-case-only character, a jury's decision
process is hard to manipulate with economic resources.").
92. John Grisham's 2008 novel THE APPEAL provides a harrowing account of the impact of
money on state judicial elections.
[VOL. 83
2015] JURIES, JUDGES, AND THE POLITICS OF TORT REFORM 921
3. Juries Bring Broadly-Based Community Values to Dispute
Resolution
Modem America is heterogeneous, and the jury, drawn from a cross-
section of the community, may well be "the most effective instrument
for incorporating the diverse ethnic, economic, religious, and social
elements of American society into the justice system." 93 Accordingly,
the output of the civil litigation process is likely to reflect a consensus
about the values of our many communities.
Similarly, juries bring the layperson's sense of justice and fair play
into the heart of the judicial process. The jury reflects the current
understandings of the larger community, and may serve as a
counterweight to the encrusted authority that judges represent.9 4 And by
giving fellow citizens the important task of determining culpability-
typically a central question in civil litigation-it reflects a community
willing to take responsibility for its judgments. 95
4. Juries Are Fair
The role of the jury is especially important given the corrective justice
basis for tort law. As Catherine Wells argues, jury adjudication is an
essential element of reaching a fair resolution of corrective justice
disputes, by "allowing the jury to evaluate a wide range of issues and by
requiring that it operate in a decisional context that produces locally
objective judgments. 96 For example, the members of a jury are better
situated than legislators to determine the appropriate amount of
compensation for the pain and suffering inflicted on the plaintiff by the
defendant, often the most open-ended aspect of a damages award. 97
Juries also protect individuals injured by an overreaching
government. This concern, so central to the American Revolution, can
now be directed at the massive scope of corporate power in citizens'
93. Stephan Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, I J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 974 (2004).
94. See, e.g., CHASE, supra note 72, at 56 ("Although the civil jury is of course an organ of
government, it nonetheless has an antistatist quality because it allows the people to decide matters
differently than the other institutions of government might wish."). The jury provides an opportunity to
incorporate community sentiment into the civil justice system. See generally NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL
BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS,
AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007).
95. See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2382
(1999).
96. Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2411 (1990).
97. Rick Swedloff& Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND.
L. J. 553, 589-90 (2009).
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lives. Most people dislike bullies, and the jury provides a chance to
balance the scales. 98
A related strength of the jury is the benefit that accrues from the
melding of multiple perspectives into a single verdict. Research
comparing group and individual decision-making supports the "law of
large numbers"-groups offer more stable and more accurate estimates
of the preferences of the population in general than individuals or small
groups. 9
9
The available empirical data rebuts the common perception that juries
are biased in favor of plaintiffs and against corporate defendants. In the
primary study of this question, Valerie Hans surveyed hundreds of
jurors after their participation in trials and concluded that "[j]urors are
often suspicious and ambivalent toward people who bring lawsuits
against business corporations. Jurors and the public are deeply
committed to an ethic of individual responsibility, and they worry that
tort litigation could be fraying the social fabric that depends on a
personally responsible citizenry." 100
Finally, juries provide an important check on the bureaucratization
and over-professionalism of the legal system. 1° 1  Because they are
drawn from the larger community, important matters are evaluated by
people with "fresh eyes," because "regular exposure to particular types
of cases, defenses, and even specific litigants may create expectations in
judges that are hard to overcome."' 10 2  Moreover, granting the jury an
important role in norm-setting and enforcement is an antidote to the
tendency toward "legal centralism" that sees the state as the sole creator
of operative rules of entitlement among individuals. 103
98. Ellen W. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 466 (2004).
See also Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2007) (most empirical
evidence suggests that juries exhibit some degree of anti-corporate bias when assessing liability and/or
damages). But see Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 717, 730 (2006) (the success rate for plaintiffs varies dramatically, with juries siding with
doctors almost 3/4 of the time in malpractice cases, while claims arising out of animal attacks resulting
in a plaintiff win more than 2/3 of the time).
99. Hans & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 377.
100. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
216 (2000).
101. See CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 69, at 9.
102. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 94, at 342.
103. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4
(1991). Thomas Jefferson expressed a similar sentiment when he commented that were he "called upon
to decide whether people had best be omitted from in the Legislature or the Judiciary department, [he]
would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative[,]" for the "execution of the laws is more
important than the making [of] them." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abb6 Arnoux (July 19,
1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282-83 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds.,
1958).
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5. Juries Legitimize the Judicial Process
In order for a citizenry to have confidence in its government, there
must be a sense that government is intrinsically fair. An open trial, in
which citizens play an important role, enhances both the understanding
of government and confidence in our system ofjustice 104
Citizen participation, in turn, serves to "secure a greater measure of
trust in all governmental institutions."' 105 Indeed, the experience of
serving on a jury often results in a citizen bringing back to her
community a newfound respect for the judicial process, creating a
valuable feedback loop. 10 6  More generally, juries can be considered
"shock absorbers," providing an outlet for public frustration with the
administration of law. 1
0 7
In addition, jury trials take place in public, with free access by
citizens and their agents in the media. This means that the public is
educated about the judicial system, and their government more
generally. In sum, jury trials make citizens more active and informed
participants in their government.108  Given the steep drop-off in jury
trials over recent decades, an important opportunity for citizens to see
their government at work is being lost. 1
09
6. Juries Generally "Get it Right"
Scholars have evaluated the claim of flawed decision-making by
104. See CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 69, at 9. See also Paul D.
Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79, 93 (2003)
("Citizen participation in the disposition of civil cases.., has served many purposes, but its enduring
purpose has been to secure a greater measure of trust in judicial institutions."); VIDMAR & HANS, supra
note 94, at 66 ("... through rendering fair and just verdicts, [juries] provide legitimacy for the legal
system.").
105. See Carrington, supra note 104, at 93.
106. Sward, supra note 98, at 466 ("[T]he jury has long been justified as an excellent educational
tool."). See also Brent T. White, Putting Aside The Rule Of Law Myth: Corruption and the Case for
Juries in Emerging Democracies, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 361 (2010) ("Jury service, in other
words, may ultimately be the best way to educate the public about the law and legal ideas, to foster a
rule of law culture, and to generate faith in the courts."); Stephano Bibas, Transparency and
Participation in Criminal Procedures, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 929 (2006) (citing authorities).
107. GREEN, supra note 62, at 376.
108. AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY
SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 54 (1998). See also NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court,
980 P.2d 337, 364 (Cal. 1999) ("[fIt is clear today that substantive courtroom proceedings in ordinary
civil cases are 'presumptively open'...."); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580
n. 17 (1980) (dictum) ("historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open").
109. Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Effect of the
Vanishing Trial on America's Social Capital, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 165, 175 ("The vanishing trial
phenomenon suggests diminishing opportunities for people to observe trials in their communities,
thereby eroding a mainstay of American democratic life.").
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
juries for almost half a century."10 Researchers have used an array of
methods, including comparing jury verdicts with judicial evaluations,
analysis of verdict patterns and trends, questionnaires and interviews
with jurors and other trial participants, and mock jury studies. The
conclusion of the vast majority of these studies is that civil jurors
perform their duties competently."'
Two specific findings are worth highlighting. First, researchers have
concluded that the strength of the evidence is by far the most important
factor in explaining a trial's outcome. Second, juries and judges
evaluate similar evidence similarly. This is true regardless of the
complexity of the issues raised. 1
2
Accordingly, despite the barrage of misleading information to the
contrary, the civil jury is "valuable" as a "proven, effective, and
important means of resolving civil disputes."" 3 Part 111(B) turns to the
characteristics of the jury's partner in the civil litigation process-
judges-and explains why control of juries is best exercised by the
authors of the common law rather than by legislators.
B. Why Judges
1. Experience: The Case-By-Case Perspective
A judge's job involves resolving disputes and most trial and appellate
judges have experience handling tort cases.' 14 Some federal judges sit
as both trial and appellate judges," 5 while service on a trial court is a
110. Hans, supra note 2, at 41-42.
111. Jennifer K. Robbenholt, Evaluating Juries By Comparison To Judges: A Benchmark For
Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 470 (2005) ("Reviews of empirical research examining jury
decision making ... attest to the overall competence of juries as decision makers."); Richard C. Waites
& David A. Giles, Are Jurors Equipped to Decide the Outcome of Complex Cases?, 29 Am. J. TRIAL
ADvOC. 41 (2005) ("More than forty years of research into jury competency reveals that juries are
exceedingly competent, even when individual jurors appear to have difficulty understanding or
navigating through the jury charge, no matter what method of research design is utilized.").
112. Hans, supra note 2, at 42-45.
113. CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 69, at 2. The groups also
went on record as opposing a central goal of tort reformers-statutory caps for damages because they
"remove important aspects of decision making from the jury." ld.at 4.
114. While the vast majority of litigation occurs in courts of general jurisdiction, there are
specialty tribunals at the federal level like the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(which handles patent claims), and a handful of states, such as Texas, that carve out certain types of
cases for separate disposition. TEX. CONST. art. 5, §§ 3, 5 (dividing jurisdiction between the Texas
Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals).
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 43(b) (2012) (allowing Supreme Court Justices to sit as judges of the courts
of appeal to which they are assigned as circuit justices). Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist famously sat
by designation as a district court judge in a 1986 civil trial in the Eastern District of Virginia. On appeal,
a three-judge panel reversed his decision (not surprisingly, via a per curiam opinion). Heislup v. Town
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common stepping stone to a seat on an appellate court at the state
level. 116  When judges resolve individual cases, and when talking with
fellow judges, they can identify patterns of jury behavior, providing a
much better basis for reforming the law than misleading media reports
and the oddball cases that can be the grist of legislative debates." 7
The ability of judges to develop this broad and deep appreciation for
the workings of the civil justice system is enhanced by relatively low
turnover. Federal judges have "life tenure" and often hear cases well
past age 70. 118 State judges also have significant job protection, ranging
from life tenure to the need to stand for reelection every six to twelve
years. In short, judges generally stay in their jobs far longer than
legislators and executive branch employees, and thus develop a broad
and deep pool of relevant experience. 119
of Colonial Beach, Va., 813 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1986). Federal Court of Appeals judges also sit as trial
judges by designation. 28 U.S.C. § 291(b) (2012) (allowing court of appeals judges to try cases). This is
not a rare occurrence. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (Judge Posner); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 344 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (Judge Rader). Almost half of the federal appellate judges previously served as trial judges.
Suzanna Sherry, Logic without Experience. The Problem of Federal Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 97, 149 (2006). Indeed, Professor Sherry argues that the federal courts would do a better job if
there was more movement among courts, which would provide appellate judges with an even deeper
understanding of the litigation process. Id. at 147-49.
116. Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing Standards Of Appellate
Review, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 735 (2007) ("As a general proposition, appellate judges are often
former trial judges."); Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L.
REV. 243, n. 140 (2000) ("Many appellate judges were once trial judges, and thus have either once sat at
the trial level with the judge whose behavior counsel is challenging on appeal, or as former trial judges,
may relate to, and sympathize with, the trial judge's behavior.").
117. Justice Holmes recognized the unique perspective of the trial judge. "A judge who has long
sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent the
common sense of the community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 124 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881).
This source of systemic knowledge of the civil justice system greatly exceeds that of legislators.
118. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 647 n.17 (2005) ("The Constitution guarantees both life tenure to Article III
judges and that their salaries cannot be diminished during their term of service. Such judges may be
removed only through impeachment, a device that is rarely used. The only other formal statutory
mechanism-aside from appellate review of lower court judgments-is to file a complaint against a
judge, handled through confidential processes within the federal judiciary."); Blake Denton, While the
Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warrant a New Interpretation of the Recess Appointments
Clause?, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 751, 767 (2009) (federal judges serve an average of 24 years).
119. See Methods of Judicial Selection, . AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/selection-of-judges.cfm?state (last visited
June 12, 2014) (providing state-by-state judicial selection regimes). Regardless of the particular
approach used in states, and that an initial appointment may be for only a year or two, the vast majority
of state judges serve terms ranging from 6-12 years, considerably longer than those available to most
state legislators, and few leave the bench involuntarily.
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2. Judges Are Predictable
Judges bring to their job substantial experience with the law and, at
least after a period of time on the bench, generate a track record that can
yield something very important to litigants and their lawyers:
predictability. 120 Even with limitations on judge-shopping, conventional
wisdom about the characteristics of judges abounds and can impact the
strategic decisions of litigants. 1
21
Judicial predictability is also enhanced by the process of how the law
governing a case is determined: Cases are decided only after
deliberation (often with other judges and law clerks) and a close
consideration of the relevant statutes and judicial decisions. 122  At the
trial level, judges are duty-bound to follow the existing law. Appellate
judges, who necessarily have more lawmaking capacity, typically go to
great lengths to tie their decisions to existing law. Moreover, when a
judge departs from previous law, the usual approach is to recognize
distinctions rather than directly overruling precedent. These
institutional characteristics enhance predictability and generally prevent
the law from being in great flux, or worse yet, appearing to be merely
the result of the exercise of raw political power.12 3
120. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Law is the Mere Continuation of Politics by Other Means. American
Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 423, 441-46 (2007); Roy A.
Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DET.
C.L. 849, 853.
121. Hans & Eisenberg, supra, note 10, at 377. Lawyers now can easily gather mounds of
information about judges, including all of his or her reported decisions, via computerized databases like
Westlaw and Lexis. See Ian Gallacher, "Aux Armes, Citoyens!:" Time for Law Schools to Lead the
Movement for Free and Open Access to the Law, 40 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 3, n.9 (2008).
122. See Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 221,
250 (2002) (judges not only evaluate texts but "have the specialized capacity to interpret[] texts,
specify[] ideas, and offer [] legal reasoning," whereas legislatures do not); Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1968-69 (2008) ("Judicial decision making is the quintessential
example of a deliberative process. Judges explain their decisions in written opinions. Explanations are
based on law, which includes precedents, binding texts, and reasoning about how those sources of law
bear on the issue presented to the court .... As the 'least dangerous branch,' the judiciary depends on
the persuasiveness of its justifications under the law for its legitimacy."); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis
and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REv. 1, 37-45 (2001) (discussing how stare decisis
and written opinions check judicial discretion).
123. See EI-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. U.S., 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 763 (2003) ("However,
we are loathe [sic] to agree that as trial judges we are not bound to follow clear precedent because its
reasoning is deficient or in apparent conflict with other precedent that can-we must be candid-be
distinguished. In our precedent-based, common law [sic] structure, trial and intermediate courts are
bound to follow decisions on the law articulated by superior courts."); Anastasoffv. United States, 223
F.3d 898, 904-05 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The
precedent from which we are departing should be stated, and our reasons for rejecting it should be made
convincingly clear. In this way, the law grows and changes, but it does so incrementally, in response to
the dictates of reason, and not because judges have simply changed their minds.").
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3. Judges are Independent
Part III(A)(2) detailed how jury decision making is less likely to be
influenced by special interest money than when officials must stand for
election. 124  This Part explains how the same is true with respect to
judges relative to officials in the executive and legislative branches.
Advocates in a legal proceeding are constrained: Besides the rules of
evidence, there are strict limits on the ability of interested parties to
engage in ex parte communications with the decision makers, either
judge or jury. 125 There are also ethical limitations on a judge's ability to
decide a case in which he or she has a financial interest. 126  More
generally, the ability of interested parties to generate "grass roots"
support or other organized pressure, while common to the legislative
process, is alien to the resolution of litigation. 127  In short, the fact that
judges, especially those appointed rather than elected, are not subject to
direct political pressure makes them more likely than other public
officials to withstand the entreaties of deep-pocketed special interests.
128
Further, judges are expected to base their decisions on the law and not
other considerations and, at least at the appellate level, to provide
explication for the positions taken in writing, and on the public
record. 1
29
The contrast to the elected branches is stark.130 Despite various "open
government" laws and initiatives, the role of vested interests in
124. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2011); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R.
2.9 (2011).
126. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11.
127. See Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUL L. REv. 533, 537 (1999) ("Organization is more essential to influencing legislatures than
courts."). There is also the ability to create the appearance of grass roots support through crafty funding
and misleading labeling. McGARTrry, supra note 77, at 58-59 (discussing the creation of "astroturf
lobbying efforts" intended to hide the fact that corporations attempt to influence government decisions).
128. See Abel, supra note 127, at 545-36 ("The assertion that legislatures are more democratic
than courts willfully ignores everything we know about those institutions. Money is essential to gaining
and retaining legislative office. A great deal of legislator behavior is governed by the fundraising
imperative."); Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 Az. L.
REV. 917, 934 (1996) ("Even given the increasing significance of contested judicial elections at the state
level, state court judges remain far less burdened by the requirements of electoral politics than state
legislators. Judges therefore do not need to cater to voters in the same way that legislators do.").
129. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of
Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) (quoting former Chief Judge of the First Circuit
Frank Coffin as stating that "a fully articulated written opinion represent[s] some guarantee against
loose thinking, sloppy workmanship, and arbitrariness") (internal quotation marks omitted); Nelson,
supra note 122, at 37-45 (discussing how stare decisis and written judicial opinions constrain judicial
discretion).
130. Abel, supra note 127, at 533 ("[C]ourts tend to be populist and deliberative, whereas
legislatures tend to be captured by special interests, secretive, hasty, and unable or unwilling to offer
reasons for their actions.").
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legislative and executive outcomes is pervasive. One need look no
further than the millions of dollars spent trying to block, and when that
failed, to water down, the changes to financial markets and institutions
that the Dodd-Frank legislation triggered. 1
31
Additionally, judges are less likely than regulators and legislators to
be "captured" by industries and other repeat players in the system.
32
Public choice theory focuses on the power of well-organized and well-
informed interest groups to win favorable legislation, which helps
agency officials secure their personal preferences. 133  This manifests in
problems with the "revolving door" between government service and
lobbying firms, now moving faster than ever, 134 with wink-and-nod
understandings that a light regulatory touch now can later yield a soft
landing in industry.1 35  Capture can also involve the significant
131. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall
Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1296-1328 (2013); Pat Garofalo, Wall Street Spending as Much to
Undermine Dodd-Frank Regulations as it Spent Trying to Block Dodd-Frank, THINK PROGRESS (Apr.
22, 2011), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2011/04/22/160524/banks-spending-2011/?mobile=nc
(millions of dollars that banks and others in the financial services industry spent in attempts to "water
down" the Dodd-Frank Act while Congress was debating it). At the state level, the pro-business
lobbying group Americans for American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has had a major impact
on state laws. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
132. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Agency Capture, and
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342 (2013) ("The set of concerns related to the influence of well-
organized special interests over regulatory decisions have come to be roughly grouped together under
the rubric of 'capture."'); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 178 (1990) (capture "is
the adoption by the regulator for self-regarding (private) reasons, such as enhancing electoral support or
post regulatory compensation, of a policy which would not be ratified by an informed polity free of
organization costs"). The classic exposition of the phenomenon of regulatory capture is George Stigler's
article, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc1. 3 (1971).
133. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 221, 225 (2012) ("Administrators, like legislators, are
considered to be self-interested, [so] public choice analysis predicts they will adopt policies favored by
business interests because they are in a better position than regulatory beneficiaries to assist agency
officials in securing their personal preferences.").
134. Holly Yeager, In D.C., Government Experience Matters Most; Sunlight Offers Numerical
Evidence, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2014, at A 15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-
dc-govemment-experience-matters-most-sunlight-offers-numerical-evidence/2014/01/26/927eI fbo-
8451-11 e3-9dd4-e7278db80d86_story.html ("There's fresh evidence that the revolving door has been
spinning faster than it used to, and that the people who travel through it are playing a bigger role on K
Street than ever before.").
135. Some regulators come from a regulated industry, while others may anticipate a cushy
industry job after leaving government. Brett McDonnell, Dampening Financial Regulatory Cycles, 65
FLA. L. REV. 1597, 1610 (2013). The revolving door addresses the frequency in which people,
especially within the federal government, move between the legislative branch, executive branch,
industry, and trade groups, at several federal agencies in particular: the Food and Drug Administration
and the Forest Service, David Zaring, Against Being against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
507, 523-24, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission. Lawrence G. Baxter, 'Capture' in
Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
175, 183-86 (2011) (explaining that "cultural" and "social" capture arise when "the language of
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informational advantages, or the "asymmetry" held by repeat players in
the regulatory process over regulators. 136
Also problematic is the strategic disbursal of research dollars
impacting the integrity of the science that government regulators
necessarily rely upon to make important decisions.' 37 As a result, deep
pocket interests have the ability to influence important government
decisions in both direct and indirect ways.' 38  While these phenomena
are well-known at the federal level, similar concerns are justified at the
state level. 1
39
In contrast, institutional capture does not sit easily with the
independent-minded streak of judges. Even when judges are elected and
the influence of campaign donations acknowledged, professional norms
as well as positive law make it highly unlikely that a supplicant would
propose, let alone gain a quid-pro-quo for the handling of a case.
140
Despite having the resources to retain top lawyers and to spend
regulation is shaped by the common backgrounds, education, experience and intermingling of the more
powerful players [in government and industry] in the policy formation process" and noting the impact of
"the very visible revolving doors between the SEC and other financial regulators and industry") (internal
citations omitted).
136. Shapiro, supra note 133, at 234 (pointing out the "dominance of business interests in the
presentation of information to an agency"). Indeed, by keeping damaging information secret and the
applicable legal rules complex, or at least complex enough that less sophisticated parties lack the
resources to invest in understanding them, regulated parties may effectively monopolize regulatory
processes through "information capture." Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky
Products through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L. J. 693, 708 (2007).
137. Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science:
Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products
and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897 (2004) (detailing the efforts of risk-creating industries to shape
science to benefit their interests and escape tort liability). One blatant example is the Advancement of
Sound Science Coalition, funded by tobacco giant Philipp Morris and later ExxonMobil, discrediting
science that recognized health hazards, while labeling industry-sponsored science as "sound science."
William C. Tucker, Deceitful Tongues: Is Climate Change Denial a Crime?, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 831, 846
(2012).
138. Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA's Air Toxic
Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 151 (2011) (finding that "at least some publicly important
rules that emerge from the regulatory state may be influenced heavily by regulated parties, with little to
no counter pressure from the public interest").
139. Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional
Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 562 (2001) (for a range of reasons, state regulatory agencies are more
subject to industry capture than federal); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory
Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 81, 123 (2002) ("Simply
put, the narrower and less-balanced array of interests active at the state and local levels means greater
risk that state and local government agencies will be captured.").
140. Abel, supra note 127, at 556 ("In practice, the need to raise money for reelection drives
legislators into the pockets of special interests. Judges, by contrast, often come to conceive of
themselves as guardians of a general interest. Their relative electoral irresponsibility, paradoxically,
protects them from capture by special interests."). Add to this the fact that defense interests spend far
more on campaign contributions intended to influence the judicial system than does the far less
centralized plaintiffs' bar. Id. at 536.
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whatever is necessary in litigation 14 1  the culture of judicial
independence is so strong that there is no serious risk that a judge would
decide a case in return for a private sector job. 142
In sum, unlike legislators and executive branch regulators, judges and
juries manifest qualities that increase the chance of just resolution of
civil disputes, and thus should be the primary shapers and appliers of the
law to facts. The next Part discusses why state judges are in a better
position to shape state law than federal judges.
4. Why State Judges
As previously mentioned, two bodies of federal constitutional law
have increasingly intruded upon the ability of states to develop their
own common law approaches to civil tort liability: Preemption and
punitive damages. 143
Preemption has become an important aspect of modem products
liability law. 144 As a result, federal courts are prohibiting state citizens
from pursuing their state law claims in their state courts, despite the
significant federalism concerns implicated. 145  Exacerbating this
problem is the fact that federal statutes are often far from clear because
of Congress's focus on regulation rather than upon private tort rights.1
46
While nodding to the "presumption against preemption," federal courts
are often guilty of treating cases as if they are simply exercises in
statutory interpretation rather than federal nullification of state law. 147
A federal judicial determination of preemption means that a
manufacturer is subject to direct regulation via often understaffed (and
sometimes captured) bureaucrats, but not indirect regulation via the
application of state tort law. 148  This outcome is especially egregious
141. Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 195 (2001)
(discussing the advantages of corporate defendants due to the ability to handle the cost of complex
litigation).
142. That is not to say that judges are never perceived as having economic factors create an
appearance of impropriety. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (judge's
refusal to recuse himself from a case in which one of the parties had spent over $3 million on behalf of
the judge's electoral campaign created "a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral
outcome" and violated due process of law).
143. See supra notes 35-39, 46-56 and accompanying text.
144. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 938 (2008) ("No issue in modem products
liability law is more important, or more inscrutable, that the doctrine of federal preemption.").
145. State courts are less likely to preempt state law than federal courts, likely because protecting
citizens from injury matters more than federal supremacy. Id. at 941.
146. DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at § 146.
147. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 742
(2008).
148. DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, supra note 2, at § 146. See also Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Law as the New Federalism, 57 DuKE L. J. 2023, 2080-83 (2008) (federal agencies may be better than
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because tort law is at the heart of state police power over safety.'49
We have also seen federal courts reject long-standing state common
law rules that allowed juries to award punitive damages to a plaintiff
harmed by a defendant's malicious conduct. 150  Like legislative damage
caps, federal judicial constraints on punitive damages harm the deterrent
effect of tort law and undercut the ability of states, and especially state
courts, to monitor and adjust the civil justice system. In sum, state
courts, likely to be more sensitive to the needs of the home state, are the
preferable locus for shaping tort doctrine.' 
51
IV. CONTROLLING JURIES FROM THE INSIDE OUT (RATHER THAN
OUTSIDE IN)
The primary focus of tort reformers has been control of juries.' 52  The
remainder of this Article considers tools that can serve that same goal
without gutting key aspects of the civil justice system.
A. Move from Standards to Rules
One way to restrain jury influence is to move from a tort system
dominated by standards to a greater reliance upon rules. This suggestion
is consistent with a civil justice system that always has reflected a blend
of approaches, with tort law especially using standards rather than
rules, 53 characterized by judges adopting open-ended legal principles
that are in the first instance applied by juries. The classic example is the
core concept of negligence: Asking the jury whether the defendant acted
the federal courts at preserving a meaningful state regulatory role); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L. J. 2125, 2127-28 (2009) (federal agencies,
and not Congress, are "the best possible protectors of state regulatory interests").
149. This presumption should be most powerful when federal courts bar state governments from
regulating in core state areas of concern, like public safety. See, e.g., Hillsborough Co. v. Automated
Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts
and Preemption of State Remedies in Collective Action Perspective, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 919, 950
(2009) ("[Courts should apply] a presumption against preemption, emphasizing the traditional role of
states' police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.").
150. OWEN, supra note 144, at 1286 ("[The Constitution] should not require that people be
deprived of what may be their most effective protection against the abuses of megalithic enterprises,
which may trample, sometimes flagrantly, and always in the pursuit of profit, the safety and other
interests of private individuals.").
151. See Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L. J. 435,
489 (2012) (["T]he development of state law is incremental. State judicial decisions employ a common
law methodology that maintains consistence and stability while providing the flexibility for courts to
adapt legal rules to new developments.").
152. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
153. A rule provides specific content to the law before an actor acts. See Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 1992 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60. For a list of only a few of the
many discussions of the rules vs. standards debates, see id. at n. 1.
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with "reasonable care in the circumstances." '1 54 The plasticity of such an
approach has allowed the common law to adjust to changes in society,
sometimes expanding liability, other times constricting it, in a complex,
organic way. 1
55
While there have long been pockets of tort law where legislative rules
supplanted judge-made law-statutes of limitation and workers
compensations schemes are the most pervasive examples-tort law has
been primarily a common law system characterized by judge-made
law. 156  For example, all of the law contained in the first American
treatise on tort law, as well as all in the first torts casebook, was judge-
made law.1 57 A corollary to this is that our tort system has traditionally
been characterized by the use of standards rather than rules: Most tort
issues are resolved ex post by the applications of relatively generalized
standards to a unique set of facts, rather than ex ante, as with rules.
158
154. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 145 (4th ed. 1971) ("[lIt is seldom possible to
reduce negligence to any definite rules..."). But see Rabin, supra note 12, at 431 (noting that
historically common law included a range of specific rules, like sovereign immunity, the privity
requirement for products liability, and the rules favoring landowners in premises liability actions, that
yielded predictability but have been modified by modem judges more concerned with corrective justice
and the deterrence of unreasonable conduct).
155. See Gregory C. Keating, Recovering Rylands: An Essay for Robert Rabin, 61 DEPAUL L.
REV. 543, 586 (2012) (lauding the common law process that makes, and then remakes tort law). This
process unfolds not just within jurisdictions, but across the entirety of tort law, as judges in one state
consider not just their own legal doctrine, but that adopted in other states. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry
D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962, 1027-28 (2002):
[O]nce a society had adopted the common law, its judges were authorized to interpret that
law in all the cases to which it applied, employing the uniquely legal form of "artificial
reasoning" by which judges molded the principles of the common law to fit the exigencies of
the day .... [I]t was the judges' special task to determine how the common law resolved
particular cases. In so doing, the judges were participating in a collective project of shaping a
general body of legal principles that was shared with judges everywhere the common law
system had been received.
156. DOBBS, supra note 2, at I ("Tort law is predominantly common law. That is, judges rather
than legislatures usually define what counts as a tort and how compensation is to be measured.");
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Legislation, 125 HARV. L. REV 1757 (2012)
("[Tort law reflects] a common law, nonlegislative, and incremental approach to the articulation of
legal wrongs that. . . expose a defendant to liability, just as we have always delegated the job of
selecting damages to a jury.").
157. Michael D. Green, The Road Less Travelled (and Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking in
Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 379 (1999).
158. Kathleen Sullivan explains the rules/standards distinction:
A legal directive is "rule"-like when it binds a decision maker to respond in a determinate
way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to
facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective choices to be worked out elsewhere.... A
legal directive is "standard"-like when it tends to collapse decision making back into the
direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow
for the decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the decision maker
more discretion than do rules. Standards allow the decision maker to take into account all
relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances.
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Legislative tort reform flies in the face of both of these important
traditions.
Admittedly, the line between rules and standards can be "fuzzy at the
edges," 159 just as there are degrees of "rule-ness," 160 but the benefits of
standards for the tort system are many. Perhaps most importantly, in a
system built to dispense corrective justice, standards tend to be more
fair: More open-ended than rules, standards are flexible and thus more
easily tailored to provide individuated consideration by the decision
maker. 161 Similarly, because they are implemented ex post via decisions
that are generally more fact-specific, outcomes can be more precisely
tailored to the circumstances.' 62  Given the almost infinite contexts in
which tort principles are applied-whether this actor was reasonable in
this circumstance, whether this defendant's misconduct caused this
plaintiffs injury, and how seriously this plaintiff was injured-it should
be no surprise that standards have long been the preferable approach. 163
Rules inevitably risk both under-and-over inclusiveness, and that
danger increases when a rule, like a cap on damages, is applied to a
broad range of situations. Like mandating one shoe size for both men
and women, rules may provide too much to some and too little to
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and of Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992).
159. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW
164 (2004).
160. Cass R. Sunnstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 959 (1995) ("Whether a legal
provision is a rule, a presumption, a principle, a standard, a guideline, a set of factors-or something
else-cannot be decided in the abstract.")
161. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 510 (1988) (defining formalism as "the
way in which rules achieve their 'ruleness' [by] ... screening off from a decision maker factors that a
sensitive decision maker would otherwise take into account").
162. Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 510
(Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
163. 1 MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.01 (2010) ("The general
purpose of compensatory damages in tort actions is to give the injured party a sum of money which will
restore him, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in if the wrong had not been
committed; in other words, to make the plaintiff whole."); Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort
Compensation, 91 GEO. L. J. 659, 660-61 (2003) (stating that "a dominant theme" among legal
academics and practitioners is that tort law is designed to return a plaintiff to the status quo ante).
There are a host of doctrines deeply imbedded in our common law of torts that reflect the
understanding that no two negligence cases are identical and that are committed to individuated
damages, like the doctrine of the "eggshell plaintiff." See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, at 465 ("[O]nce
defendant [is negligent and puts someone at risk] the thin skill rule provides that he is liable for all the
personal injuries actually caused, although they may be greater than those that would be suffered by a
normal person."). Similar concern with nuance is reflected in the bedrock notion of cause in fact.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 28 cmt. b (2010) provides:
The difficulty that courts confront is that the line between reasonable inference and
prohibited speculation is one of the more indistinct lines that exists in law and also is one on
which reasonable minds can and do differ. Different courts draw those lines at different
points at different times; comparison of cases is very difficult because modest differences in
the evidence can substantially affect the power of an inference.
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others. 164 Perhaps the greatest proponent of tort rules was Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. In his classic work The Common Law, he wrote:
"It is equally clear that the featureless generality, that the defendant was
bound to use such care as a prudent man would do under the
circumstances, ought to be continually giving place to the specific one,
that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those
circumstances." 1
65
When Holmes was on the Supreme Court of the United States late in
his career, he was able to implement his preference for rulemaking by
common law judges. In B&O Railroad v. Goodman,'66 Holmes, for a
unanimous Court, held that a driver who was injured at a railroad
crossing could recover damages only if he had stopped his vehicle
before crossing, regardless of the other facts presented. Only seven
years later, with Holmes retired, the Court reconsidered the wisdom of
imposing such a rule in another railroad crossing case, Pokora v.
Wabash Ry. Co. 167  This time, the Court, led by another giant of the
common law, Benjamin Cardozo, recognized the myriad variations of
track location, amount of traffic, nature and speed of the plaintiffs
vehicle, time of day, etc., and reverted to the time-tested case-by-case
use of a standard. As Cardozo's unanimous opinion aptly observed,
"[There must be] caution in framing standards of behavior that amount
to rules of law."'' 6
8
A common justification for preferring rules made by government
officials to standards applied by a lay jury is that rules are the result of
careful deliberation. While this may characterize the work of appellate
judges, it is often not the case with legislators.' 69 Even well-intending
legislatures, especially at the state level (where most tort reform
originates), are chronically understaffed, increasing the risk that a law
164. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 162, at 2.
165. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 89 (Mark D. Howe ed., Harv. Univ.
Press 1963) (1st ed. 1881).
166. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
167. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
168. Id. at 105. While Justice Holmes had a huge influence on the law generally, his foray into
tort rule-making failed. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Justice Holmes believed that courts would (at least, should) slowly reduce all
of tort law to objective, readily applied rules. This is not viewed today as one of his more astute
predictions.") (internal citation omitted). See also Robert L. Rabin, Reflections on Tort and the
Administrative State, 61 DEPAuL L. REv. 239, 260, n.80 (2012) (pointing out the tension between
Holmes' preference for the predictability of rules with his full-throated advocacy of a system built on
such a context-sensitive concept as negligence).
169. See Hanah Metchis Volokoh, A Read-the-Bill-Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REv. 135 (2011)
(discussing the many circumstances in which members of Congress do not have the time to read bills
before voting).
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will fail to reflect a careful balancing of all considerations.170
Also relevant is the power of special interest money in the legislative
process, which may make robust debate and optimal outcomes less
likely. 171 The chance that a fair law will result from the legislative
process is lessened because of the powerful impact of lobbying by
interest groups. 172 Specifically, in the civil justice context the Chamber
of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America, and the American Medical
Association, have poured millions of dollars into legislative
advocacy. 17
3
Regulation via rules also risks obsolescence. A rule freezes the law in
place, ignoring newly available information or changing values. 174 Even
a well-crafted rule may become out-of-step with changed exogenous
realities, and there is no guarantee that a legislature will update a rule
due to the press of other legislative business or rent-seeking behavior.'
7 5
Similarly, while standards undoubtedly can impose higher
administrative costs due to case-by-case ex post adjudication, rules also
have a process cost: They may not be rewritten to keep up with changes
in society. 176
Rules also may be nullified when the party is asked to apply what is
perceived as an unfair rule. 177  One example of this has already been
observed in the context of damage caps, as there are reports that jurors
who want to award an amount above a legislative cap on non-economic
damages respond by increasing the amount of the compensatory
170. K. Nicholas Portz, Education Reform Litigation in Nevada: Is the Nevada Legislature
Neglecting its Constitutional Duties?, 11 NEV. L. J. 849, 875 (2011) (many state legislatures are
underpaid, understaffed, and part-time; the lack of valuable resources compromises the legislature's
ability to create meaningful legislation).
171. The negative influence of money in politics is well-established, and is likely to become an
even more serious problem given decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that provide
constitutional protection to special interest campaign spending. See e.g., Citizens United v. Federal
Election Com'n, 558 U.S. 310, 335-36 (2010) (first amendment precludes federal regulation of
independent campaign expenditures by corporations and labor unions). See also C.M.A. McCauliff,
Didn't Your Mother Teach You to Share? Wealth, Lobbying and Distributive Justice in the Wake of the
Economic Crisis, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 429 (2010) ("If taking a more representative set of voices
into political account does not occur, as some expect the effect of Citizens United to be, lobbying will
only continue to become a more and more disabling problem for democratic govemment.").
172. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 162, at 5.
173. See Hubbard, supra note 91, at 475 (detailing the massive industry resources available to
lobby in state capitals); Dawn House, Tort Reform: What about the Little Guy?, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
819 (2006) (detailing power of industry to influence federal regulatory law).
174. Kaplow, supra note 153, at 616.
175. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 162, at 4. See also Gilles, supra note 18, at 693 (California cap
on medical malpractice damages, set at $250,000 in 1975, is now effectively less than $100,000 due to
inflation).
176. FARNSWORTH, supra note 159, at 168.
177. id. at 166.
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damages, which typically are not subject to a cap. 178
Finally, standards applied by a lay jury have the virtue of increasing
citizen involvement, engaging citizens in moral deliberation as well as
the operation of government, thus serving democratic values. 179 Rather
than having rote application of a rule by a government bureaucrat or
even by a judge, the traditional tort system is an immersive experience
for a juror, asking a layperson to evaluate the behavior of another
citizen, the severity of harm to an injured fellow citizen, and whether a
particular act caused the plaintiffs injury.'1 80
In sum, powerful reasons of both historical practice and current public
policy cut against the usurpation of the common law by the imposition
of legislative rules. Because juries apply rather than make law, the other
virtues of jury decision-making should make the default approach
laypeople and judges collaborating to make law manifest. 181
Despite the wisdom and prevalence of standards in tort law, a
common law court concerned with the erratic behavior of juries has the
inherent power to adopt a rule, placing more power in the hands of
judges. There are many examples: the requirement of privity barred
juries from determining whether the manufacturer of a product was
negligent; the limited duties owed to licensees and trespassers in the
premises liability context meant that juries could not award damages due
to a landowner's lack of reasonable care; and the "fellow servant rule"
that barred an employee from recovery for workplace injuries in most
circumstances. 182 More recently, courts have shielded property owners
from liability for crime on their premises without a prior similar assault,
limited the ability of spectators to recover for injuries while attending a
sporting event,18 3 and adopted a new no-duty rule that that makes it
178. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance about
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361 (2005) (discussing impact
of juror behavior in the context of damage caps). Another example is the long-recognized tendency of
juries to bypass the harshness of contributory negligence by reaching compromise verdicts. See
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Vicissitudes of Tort: A Response to Professors Rabin, Sebok & Zipursky, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 711 (2011).
179. See Sharkey, supra note 178, at 711.
180. Id.
181. See Michael L. Wells, Scott v. Harris and the Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation,
29 REV. LITG. 65, 93 (2009) ("The rules-versus standards issue differs slightly from the judge-jury
problem, as standards may be applied by either a judge or a jury. Nonetheless, the two are closely
related. Since juries cannot make rules, choosing rules over standards necessarily entails a greater role
for judges.").
182. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience
with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 467-70 (1999) ("From all around the nation there were
many cases.., that cast aside old 'no duty' rules.... The practical result of the elimination of many of
these old rules (seen most clearly in the occupier liability area) was to transfer much power from judges
to juries.").
183. See Ronald Steiner, Policy Oscillation in California's Law of Premises Liability, 39
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harder for plaintiffs to prevail when asbestos brought home from the
workplace injures family members.' 84  Indeed, "[w]e have lots of new
rules and judicial decision-making in cases that, in prior years would
have gone to juries with vague instructions about fault attached."' 85
B. Invigorate Summary Judgment
A liability regime can be tipped away from broad jury power without
fundamentally altering the substantive law. This tactic has been
identified in the line of cases in which the Supreme Court of the United
States facilitated the use of summary judgment to remove cases from the
jury. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,186 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,187
and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,188 the
Court provided federal trial judges greater latitude to resolve the merits
of a case without a full presentation of the facts to a jury. 189 This
generous availability of summary judgment-which is overwhelmingly
to the advantage of defendants in tort litigation 9 -has been accelerated
by more recent decisions that have eroded the long-standing practice of
allowing a plaintiff to take advantage of notice pleading, and then use
the discovery process to develop evidence.'
1 91
There is also another noteworthy example of incremental tort reform
at the federal level: the Supreme Court of the United States, in a string
MCGEORGE L. REV. 131 (2008) (discussing how California courts moved from a standard to a rule in
cases involving crime on the premises). See also Davidoff v. Metro. Baseball Club, 463 N.E.2d 1219
(N.Y. 1984) (adopting a limited duty rule rather than a negligence-based standard).
184. Meghan E. Flinn, Note, Continuing War with Asbestos: The Stalemate among State Courts
on Liability for Take-home Asbestos Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 713 (2014).
185. Sugarman, supra note 182, at 487. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day before Trials
Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 698 (2004) ("Power and discretion have shifted away from
the jury and more and more now is in the hands of the judge. To put it another way, the long-term
historical development is to shift decision making from amateurs to professionals.").
186. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
187. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
188. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
189. See Bert 1. Huang, Trial By Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 n.6 (2013). See also
Cecil, et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 866 (2007) ("the three opinions, taken together.., urged greater
openness and receptivity to summary judgment").
190. See Cecil, et. al., supra note 189, at 886-89 (noting that summary judgment motions in
federal cases are far more common, and far more likely to be granted to defendants, than summary
judgment motions filed by plaintiffs).
191. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009), the Court called into question what seemed to be settled law regarding the level of factual detail
needed in a complaint, adopting a more rigorous "factual plausibility" regime. Joshua A. Douglas,
Election Law Pleading, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1966, 1967-68 (2013). See also Mark Moller,
Procedure's Ambiguity, 86 IND. L. J. 645 (2011) (drawing comparisons between Twombly and Iqbal and
the summary judgment trilogy).
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of decisions over two decades, reshaped the law of defamation, resulting
in a reduced risk that defendants will face significant civil judgments
imposed by a jury.' 92  These changes were the product of a series of
gradual adjustments over time, much like the case-by-case approach
familiar to the common law. 1
93
A similar trend has been identified at the state level. In a careful
empirical study of decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, David
Anderson concluded that defendants won 87% of the cases decided with
an opinion. 194  This tilt to favor defendants was accomplished without
alteration of the substantive law of torts. The court did so by relying on
statutory interpretation, close construction of pleadings, the strict
application of procedural rules, and a painstaking review of the evidence
that would usually have been left to a jury. 195
Judges clearly have the capacity to adjust the civil justice system if it
tilts too far in one direction (or another), and such an approach avoids
the pitfalls of ill-informed legislators and executive officers trying to
find the right balance from outside of the system. 1
96
C. Tighten the Rules of Evidence
Another procedural reform that could provide greater control of juries
is to tighten the rules of evidence. Beginning with the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 197 federal courts,
and since then an increasing number of state courts, have made it harder
for plaintiffs in tort cases to get to a jury by rejecting the plaintiff's
proffer of expert testimony.
This is especially true in products liability, medical malpractice, and
toxic tort claims, which often require expert testimony. 198 For example,
it may be difficult for a plaintiff in a products liability action to trace her
192. See David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Defamation
Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503 (2001) (detailing how changes to defamation law resulted in many fewer
examples of large verdicts punishing unpopular defendants).
193. Unlike the changes to pleading requirements discussed in the previous paragraph, New York
Times v. Sullivan and its progeny construed the Constitution, but in both contexts the changes resulted
from case-by-case deliberation over a period of years.
194. Anderson, supra note 5, at I1. Professor Anderson also concluded that in twelve cases in
which Wal-Mart was a tort defendant, the corporate defendant always won, while in other states the
company's success rate was 56%. Id.
195. Id. at 18. The most frequent tool was an unprecedented willingness to hold that there was
"no evidence" to support the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 23.
196. See Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-Revolution,
110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 677-83 (2008) (describing the "revolution and counter-revolution in tort law").
197. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
198. See Christopher R.J. Pace, Admitting And Excluding General Causation Expert Testimony:
The Eleventh Circuit Construct, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 47, 47-48 (2013).
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injury or condition to a defective product when it is also associated with
background risk. 199 Similarly, a plaintiff injured by defendant's product
may have to introduce expert testimony to prove that there was a safer
alternative design for the product than the one adopted by the defendant,
and if one does not already exist, suggest how it could be developed, 200
or that the defendant's design did not comply with the "state of the
art., 20 1 In medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff may need an expert to
prove causation and almost always must support the allegation of
negligence by an expert's testimony on how the defendant diverged
from medical custom. 20 2  Similar evidentiary hurdles face plaintiffs
attempting to prove toxic torts.203
While Daubert construed the Federal Rules of Evidence, its approach
to expert testimony has been followed in many states.20 4 In general, this
more restrictive approach to expert testimony favors defendants and
results in closer control over juries. 20 5
D. Improve Jury Performance
This Article has analyzed how a move from standards to rules may
cure the concern with jury unpredictability when determining whether a
defendant is liable for the injury caused to the plaintiff. 206 This Part
examines a similar inconsistency problem caused by the amorphous
nature of damages rules in tort actions.20 7 Indeed, tort reformers have
focused much of their effort on constricting the jury's ability to award
199. See Joseph Sanders, The Controversial Comment C: Factual Causation in Toxic-Substance
and Disease Cases, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1034 (2009) (pattern of exclusion of plaintiffs
causation expert followed by summary judgment for defendant is "quite familiar").
200. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, Doctrinal
Evolution, and David Owen's Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 518-19 (2006).
201. OwEN, supra note 144, § 10.4, at 706.
202. Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Requirement
for Establishing the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 51, 51-52 (2007).
203. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using their
Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335-36 (1999)
(evidentiary rulings involve "the social allocation of risk and who should bear the burden of scientific
uncertainty or controversy-injured people or manufacturers .... "); Mark Geistfeld, Scientific
Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1017-23 (2001).
204. Indeed, when the federal evidentiary rule is different from the state rule, plaintiffs prefer
litigating in state court. Arthur Hellman, Another Voice for the "Dialogue": Federal Courts as a
Litigation Course, 53 ST. LOUiS U. L. J. 761, 766-67 (2009).
205. Andrew Jurs, Gatekeeper With A Gavel: A Survey Evaluating Judicial Management of
Challenges to Expert Reliability and their Relationship to Summary Judgment, 83 MiSS. L. J. 325, 346
(2014). Not surprisingly, this difference manifested itself in a greater frequency of motions to exclude
expert testimony. Id. at 365.
206. See supra notes 153-185 and accompanying text.
207. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of our Tort
System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2004).
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damages, with special attention to punitive and noneconomic
damages. 208
Monetizing injuries-selecting a damage figure for a plaintiffs
personal injury-is inherently difficult for a multitude of reasons.2 °9
First, there is the problem of incommensurability, as we ask the jury to
place a dollar figure on something that cannot be replaced.210 Second,
there is no agreed upon metric, especially with regard to non-pecuniary
awards .2 1  Third, there is no market against which to evaluate
appropriate awards.212 Finally, jurors are given little meaningful
213guidance. As a result, there is a high risk of unprincipled differences
in outcomes in similar cases.214
Collecting relevant data about the value of a case is difficult because
very few tort claims are litigated to a public conclusion. Indeed, many
out-of-court settlements are subject to secrecy restrictions, meaning that
there is only a snapshot of the system available to those who might want
to draw conclusions, or even inferences, about how individual cases are
resolved.21 5
While there have been occasional calls for eliminating pain and
suffering damages entirely, 216  which would certainly improve
predictability, such an extreme remedy has been broadly rejected, and
for good reason. Eliminating these damages would cause a core goal of
the tort system to be unmet: "making the plaintiff whole. 2 17 However,
208. Roederer, supra note 196, at 687.
209. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for Trial by Formula, 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 580 (2012) ("The
problem with this understanding of injury valuation is that the tort system does not approximate the
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. The tort system is an institution that is supposed to monetize
injuries, yet injuries are not readily monetizable.").
210. Joseph Sanders, Reforming General Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS
U.L. REV. 73, 142 (2008). See also Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785 (1990);
Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Ellen S. Pryor,
Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L. J. 659 (2003).
211. Swedloff & Huang, supra note 97, at 589. See also Randall R. BQvbjerg et al., Valuing Life
and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 938 (1989). Similar
criticisms are levelled at punitive damages, but because they are awarded in a small percentage of cases,
and in any event are subject to federal constitutional and state limitations, they will not be discussed
here. See Lahav, supra note 209, at 582-83.
212. Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law,
57 S.M.U. L. REV. 163, 175 (2004).
213. Id.
214. Sanders, supra note 210, at 142.
215. Lahav, supra note 209, at 579.
216. Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering Damages,
42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 431, 444 (2009) ("Only a few of the most strident critics would abolish
[noneconomic damages] altogether").
217. See Rabin, supra note 12, at 441 ("In view of such an open-ended, indeterminate standard
and the corresponding conceptual difficulties of monetizing intangible loss, some have argued that pain
and suffering damages should be eliminated.... But these remonstrances have fallen on deaf ears; the
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there have been less drastic proposals that attempt to improve jury
decision-making, without fundamentally limiting the jury's important
and time-tested role in the civil justice process.
One way to improve jury performance is to add to the tools juries can
use to render decisions. Valerie Hans, among others, has advocated
"active jury reforms," changes to litigation that "encourage jurors'
vigorous participation in their decision making. ' 218 Some long-standing
practices complicate the efforts of jurors to do their jobs in a competent
and conscientious manner. For example, jurors have traditionally not
been allowed to take notes, nor discuss the case with fellow jurors until
closing arguments have been made and the judge has instructed on the
applicable law. Similarly, jurors cannot ask questions of the witnesses
or of the judge, until the jury is instructed and begins its deliberations. 219
While these procedural rules are not in themselves illogical, they have
by and large outlived their usefulness.22 °
The American Bar Association (ABA) has recognized that such
practices frustrate rather than improve jury performance. In its report,
"Principles for Juries and Jury Trials," the ABA endorsed juror note
taking, the use of notebooks to allow jurors to have exhibits with them
after they are introduced, juror questioning, and lifting the ban on juror
discussion of the case during presentation.22' Some states have begun to
experiment with changing these rules and this momentum should
continue.2 22
Another way to improve jury predictability is to provide decision
makers with more information, and there is already a model that has
done so for over a century.223 Workers' compensation systems have
used a schedule that pre-determines what award is associated with a
specific injury, implemented by a government bureaucrat. Such systems
courts adhere to recognition of individualized pain and suffering recovery as a foundational principle of
tort damages.").
218. Hans, supra note 2, at 40.
219. This ban makes sense in the criminal context, where fundamental liberties are at stake, but
far less so in the civil context. Antoinette Plogstedt, E-Jurors: A View from the Bench, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 597, 617-19 (2013).
220. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 94, at 32-33.
221. AM. BAR ASS'N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 17 (2005), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/juryprojectstandards/principles.authchekdam.pdf.
222. Hans, supra note 2, at 50-55.
223. While the following discussion focuses on providing juries information that could lead to do
a better job assessing damages, there are also advocates for changing the rules of evidence so as to allow
the jury to consider that the plaintiff in fact had some of her damages covered by a collateral sources;
was not wearing a seatbelt or was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the accident; and
that a finding of joint and several liability may lead to a single defendant paying for more than its fair
share of the injury. See Steven B. Hantler, et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 21 (2005).
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have been criticized for, among other things, pervasively low awards,22 4
but there is nothing inherent in adopting such an approach to setting
noneconomic damages that would dramatically undercompensate
injured plaintiffs. Indeed, such a result would be patently unfair because
a tort plaintiff, unlike a workers' compensation claimant, typically has to
prove that the injury was the result of defendant misconduct. 225
In a handful of other contexts, the traditional civil justice system has
been supplanted in all or part by an administrative regime for handling
injury claims, including providing redress in products liability claims
(dalkon shield and vaccines) and in response to mass disasters (the 9/11
and BP Gulf Spill compensation regimes).226 While these alternatives
have differing characteristics, they all remove judges and juries from the
deliberative process and minimize the evaluation of the conduct of the
parties. Additionally, they may substantially limit the chance for the full
and fair compensation to a plaintiff who proves all of the elements of a
civil claim.22
Distinguished scholars like Cass Sunstein have argued for an
analogous approach to setting damages in all tort actions. Sunstein
proposes that "specialists in the subject matter at hand" develop a
schedule similar to that found in workers' compensation and other
administrative payment schemes. 229 The most dramatic version would
be to set a specific dollar figure that binds the jury. Such an approach
would streamline litigation and greatly limit, if not eliminate, the
concerns with variability and fairness that the current practice risks by
treating like cases differently. 230 However, this approach is fatally
224. PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 1-2 (1998).
225. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1449, 1571 (2010) (under workers' compensation, the fault of both employer and
employee is immaterial and the amounts payable to the employee are determined by a schedule of
benefits rather than by ad hoc jury awards).
226. Malika Kanodia, The Fate of the Injured Patient in Wake of Reigel v. Medtronic: Should
Congress Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REv. 791, 833 (2009); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Is the Glass Half-
Empty or Half-Full?, 44 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 349, 351-53 (2012).
227. Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Funds and the Election of Remedies: The Need for Informed
Consent, 31 REV. LITIG. 833, 864-65 (2012).
228. CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURORS DECIDE 242 (2002) ("[S]erious
consideration should be given to moving away from the jury and toward a system of civil fines, perhaps
through a damages schedule of the sort that has been used in many areas of the law, including workers'
compensation and environmental violations.").
229. Id. at 252-54 (identifying various administrative schemes for determining compensation
and/or penalties, including workers' compensation schedules, criminal sentencing guidelines, and social
security disability determination grids, as precedents for his proposed "schedule of fines and
penalties."). See also ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY II.C.8.IV n.30 (1991) (fixing
damages via "a consortium of experienced judges, lawyers, insurers, doctors, and others, whose
conclusions would then be adopted by the state legislature or the state supreme court").
230. Neal R. Fiegenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHL-KENT L. REv. 239, 281
(2003).
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flawed because it eviscerates the various contributions that juries make
to the civil justice system. Moreover, this approach is fundamentally
inconsistent with the basic tort principle that each victim is entitled to an
award tailored to his or her circumstances, set by a lay jury.231
Recognizing this problem, Sunstein proposes alternatively that a fact
finder be able to consider a range of possible awards, providing
guidance (rather than limits) to a group that has never before been
tasked with setting damages. 232  Other proposals from scholars 233 and
the ABA 234 respond to the problems of unbounded scale for non-
pecuniary awards, the absence of relevant anchors, and the presence of
irrelevant ones, which may plague jury damage setting under traditional
arrangements.235 Providing such yardsticks would also respond to
complaints from jurors that they lack adequate information to set
damages effectively.236
While this would improve predictability, such an approach would
only be as good as the quality of the methodology for selecting which
cases were factually similar enough to be included in the range. This is
a significant challenge under the best of circumstances, but increasingly
problematic when the vast majority of tort cases are settled and thus not
part of any available public record.237  However, this problem can be
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[T]he law of torts attempts
primarily to put an injured person as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort.")
(emphasis added).
232. SUNSTEIN, supra note 228, at 248-49. See also Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain
and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn't Be (Just) about Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 195, 207-
12 (2008) (proposing a three-step damage schedule prepared by a panel of laypeople enlisted to rank
injuries "from worst to least bad," with the legislature translating the rankings (presumably with the help
of experts) into a series of maximum award categories, and finally having the jury decide which
category applies to the case at bar); Ronald J. Allen et al., An External Perspective on the Nature of
Noneconomic Compensatory Damages and their Regulation, 56 DEPAuL L. REV. 1249, 1257, 1275
(2007) (advocating legislative schedules, either exact amounts or ranges, which would be "modeled, in
part, after sentencing guidelines used in the states").
233. Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General Damages
(Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489 (2006) (cataloging and critiquing various
proposals that constrict jury authority to set damages).
234. SEE AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT
LIABILITY SYSTEM 14 (1987) (recommending "tort award commissions" be "established to gather and
report information on damage awards for incorporation into jury instructions, for use in damage additur
and remittitur review, and for use in the settlement process.").
235. Fiegenson, supra note 230, at 281.
236. Michael Dann, Jurors and the Future of "Tort Reform, " 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1135-
36 (2003).
237. David M. Studdert, Rationalizing Noneconomic Damages: A Health-Utilities Approach, 74
L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 57, 69 (2011). See also Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-
Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100
Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 103 (2006) ("All of these solutions, however, are administratively complicated, and
therefore possibly prohibitively costly. Who decides the schedules, matrices, scenarios, or guidelines?
What criteria do they use? The more detailed the scenarios or guidelines are, the more costly it is to
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viewed as only an administrative variation on a characteristic baked into
the adversarial process: the quality of the lawyers representing the
parties.238
E. Overrule the Jury
As a last resort, judges may control jury behavior by overruling the
jury. The familiar tool of "judgment as a matter of law" allows the
judge to reject a jury verdict. The focus here is on the jury's
determination of liability, and the judge uses the same standard as that
used for a directed verdict motion and summary judgment: One party,
usually the defendant, is entitled to a decision in its favor as a matter of
law because there was insufficient proof of an essential element of the
prima facie case. 239  As discussed earlier, the power to screen out
substantively weak cases is one that can expand or contract, depending
upon a court's judicial philosophy about the role of the jury.240
Because legislative tort reform has focused most often on preventing
juries from assessing large damage awards, enhancing the role of the
judge in reviewing the damage award is another way to limit, but not
destroy, the role of the jury in providing remedies. Trial judges can
exercise their power to grant a new trial if the evidence does not support
the award.241 In this context, the judge "sits as the 13th juror," and can
make the sort of credibility determinations that are generally off limits
when ruling on other dispositive motions.242 This power does not mean
design them.").
238. See Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 Mo.
L. REV. 707, 722 (2008) ("The competent presentation of claims and defenses and the effective
maneuvering through complex procedural rules rests fully on the advocates' skills and resources. As
equality between them declines, so too does the system's ability to redeem the promises implicit in Lady
Justice's scales.").
239. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R. Ctv. P.), a losing party may overturn a
verdict when the court is convinced that no reasonable jury could have found the facts necessary to
support the verdict. In other words, a JNOV is appropriate "only if the evidence, viewed from the
perspective most favorable to the nonmovant, is so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled to
judgment, for reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome." Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37
F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994). Similar standards are used in state courts. David Hittner & Lynn
Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas: State and Federal Practice, 46 HOuS. L. REV. 1379, 1383
(2010).
240. See supra notes 153-205 and accompanying text. A given state's approach may change over
time, as well. See Aaron J. Hayes, Should a Scintilla Be Enough? The Proper Standard for Summary
Judgment in South Carolina, 61 S.C. L. REV. 737 (2010) (describing evolving standards applied in
South Carolina state courts).
241. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 358.
242. JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability Review,
51 BUFF L. REv. 251, 261-62 (2003) ("[T]hrough the motion for a new trial, the trial judge has the
opportunity to act almost as a thirteenth juror and to weigh the evidence to determine the validity of the
jury's judgment.").
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the trial judge is simply allowed to overrule the jury merely because of a
difference of opinion; generally, the award must be "clearly excessive"
to override the usual role of the jury to determine facts.243 There is also
244the related practice of remittitur, which conditions the grant of a new
trial on the willingness of a plaintiff to accept a lower award identified
by the trial judge.245
Using post-trial motions rather than legislative caps to control juries
is an attractive alternative because trial judges, unlike legislators (and
even appellate judges), have firsthand knowledge of all aspects of the
trial, including important "soft information" that may not appear in the
trial transcript on review, 246 and appellate review of an award of a new
trial is handled, appropriately, under a narrow "abuse of discretion"
standard.247
Post-trial motions also provide the opportunity for close evaluation of
jury awards of damages and are considerably more tailored and
equitable than damage caps. Moreover, over time, this practice could
prompt development of helpful comparative data to better identify
excessive awards.248 Along the same lines, a trial judge could look at
"comparability"--evaluating the reasonableness of a particular damage
243. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 677 (7th ed.
2011). Despite the right to a jury trial imbedded in the federal and many constitutions, the grant of a
new trial is available because it merely allows another lay jury to consider the evidence. See Albert D.
Brault & John A. Lynch, Jr., The Motion for New Trial and its Constitutional Tension, 28 U. BALT. L.
REV. 1, 114 (1998) ("Until recently, most American jurisdictions viewed grant of a new trial as posing
no threat to the right to trial by jury. This is because the grant of this motion was followed by another
jury trial."). See also Pamela J. Stevens, Controlling the Civil Jury: Towards a Functional Model of
Justification, 76 Ky. L. J. 81, 128 (1987) (providing history of new trial motions).
244. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 775 (1995) (the A.B.A. Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability
System recommended increased use of remittitur to set aside verdicts "clearly disproportionate to
community expectations").
245. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 499 (3d ed. 2012) ("This use of the conditional
new trial through remittitur, obviously, is a way the court might play hardball with the plaintiff. The
court tries to pressure the plaintiff to remit what the court believes is excessive damages."). Because
remittitur allows the trial judge to identify a lower award than that set by the jury, there are more
substantial concerns about erosion of the jury's role than with new trial motions generally. Brault &
Lynch, supra note 243.
246. See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 448 (2004) ("[A]nyone who has absorbed a trial solely through its
transcript knows that it can be a frustrating and incomplete experience."). See also Noonan v. Cunard
Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting the trial judge's "superior opportunity to get 'the
feel of the case."') (internal citation omitted).
247. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996) (a district court's review of a
jury's determination of damages "would be subject to appellate review under the standard the circuits
now employ when inadequacy or excessiveness is asserted on appeal: abuse of discretion.").
248. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157 (2008)
(recommending that courts safeguard the jury-trial right by increasing the trial judge's discretion to grant
a new trial on the weight of the evidence and by requiring a balanced appellate review of decisions
granting and denying new trials).
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award by comparing it to the amounts awarded in other similar cases in
that court. 24 9 This approach raises the same concerns about the ability to
gather accurate data identified in the previous part, 250  but would
represent an improvement over legislatively imposed caps.
V. CONCLUSION
From the founding of our country, we trusted juries, supervised by
judges, to fairly resolve civil disputes. That trust began to erode in the
1970s, and has since been replaced by an industry-created narrative that
juries are irrational and incompetent, constantly handing down huge
verdicts that threaten the existence of the corporations that have made
our standard of living the envy of most of the world.
With that story line in place, corporate America successfully
promoted its agenda, with the result being four decades of changes to a
civil justice system that has served us well for more than two centuries,
and almost always in the direction of making it harder for injured people
to receive full compensation. The fundamental flaw in many of the
reforms is that they fail to render justice in each specific case.251 In
contrast, we have deep experience with judges and juries evaluating and
resolving a host of important issues-intent, fault, consent, causation,
and damages 252-and there is precious little evidence of persistent and
significant error to justify usurping this tried and true combination of
dispute resolution.
At first blush, it might seem puzzling that democratically elected
legislators targeted the civil jury, one of our most democratic
institutions, but this simply reflects the power wielded by pro-business
interests to elect and then lobby friendly legislators and executive
249. See J. Patrick Elsevier, Out-Of-Line: Federal Courts Using Comparability to Review
Damage Awards, 33 GA. L. REv. 243, 244-58 (1998). One noteworthy effort to use de novo appellate
review of a jury verdict was proposed by one of the leading judges of the last century, Roger Traynor,
the long-serving (and generally pro-plaintiff) Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. In a
dissent, he called for closer judicial scrutiny of pain and suffering awards than that provided under the
prevailing "shocks the conscience" standard. In Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 346
(1971), Chief Justice Traynor, in his dissent, reviewed the reported California cases, and concluded that
awards for pain and suffering were generally consistent with awards for pecuniary (economic) damages,
and that injuries to legs and feet of the sort in the case under review uniformly resulted in total awards
less than $100,000. In sum, both sets of information justified a conclusion that the $134,000 jury award
was excessive, and Traynor would have reversed. Seffert is discussed in detail in Goldberg & Ziprusky,
supra note 11, at 467.
250. See supra note 215, and accompanying text.
251. Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2413-14 (1990) ("If I am correct that the value of the tort system
is in its quest for individual justice, then ... fairness is an important aspiration for tort law and case-
specific consensus decision-making is essential to achieving fair outcomes.").
252. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 11, at 483.
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branch regulators. Similarly unsurprising is that these laws are enacted
by legislatures containing fewer and fewer lawyers, in an atmosphere of
misleading media coverage.
Even though numerous studies have concluded that juries generally
do a good job of determining facts and applying the law to the facts, the
system obviously needs checks on decision making by lay juries.253
Similarly, while judges are also imperfect, the judiciary, which is
populated by professionals with the most information about what goes
on in the civil justice system, is a far better institutional choice to
provide the necessary reforms than legislatures.254
This Article identifies an array of options that judges can implement
to yield better performance by the jury. This is no surprise; for all of our
history, courts have adopted different blends of substance, procedure,
and remedies in their molding of the common law, using states as
laboratories. 255 This time-tested approach recognizes that our civil
justice system is a "peculiarly American jurisprudence, creative,
decentralized, and thereby often messy. Certainly it is never
stagnant.
' 256
Nor should it be.
253. Robertson, supra note 248, at 157 ("Empirical studies show that juries generally perform
their job conscientiously and that the large majority of jury verdicts are accurate and fair. But some
outliers remain, and even a small number of seemingly unjust jury verdicts can shake the public's faith
in the jury system as a whole.").
254. See Jeb Barnes, Rethinking The Landscape of Tort Reform: Legislative Inertia and Court-
Based Tort Reform in the Case of Asbestos, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 157, 164 (2007) ("Scholars have long
recognized that judges can powerfully shape the adjudication process in the absence of legislation. Most
prominently, judges were on the forefront of expanding the scope and potency of tort law .. "); Green,
supra note 62, at 375 ("The adjustment of the difficulties of everyday life through the dual agency of the
expert and the lay citizen-judge and jury-is the dominant idea of Anglo-American courthouse
government.").
255. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.").
256. Marshall S. Shapo, Judges and Products Law: Provisional Truths and Designated
Designers, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 405, 410 (1999). See also Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the
Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1512 (2009) ("courts have been
'experimenting' with tort law through the development of common law for well over a century").
zA
